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ARTICLES
THE COMPARATIVE AND THE CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS

Angel R. Oquendot
1. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic increase in transnational business has given

rise to a new international legal reality. Nations with diverse
legal backgrounds have been increasingly creating both substantive and procedural law to regulate the abundance of international economic activity.' It would have seemed natural to start
the process of generating a new international legal reality by
pondering the differences and similarities of the existing national

systems. This kind of approach would have opened up the prospect of choosing intelligently among the various options or of
combining them in a coherent manner. More importantly, the
deliberative effort might have paved the way for a critique of the

prevailing paradigms and ultimately suggested previously
unimagined possibilities.
It appears, however, that there has been virtually no com-

parative or critical introspection along these lines. International
lawmakers all too often view the creation of a new multinational
legal scheme as a mere technical problem, 2 that is, as a question

t Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Ph.D, M.A.,
A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Yale University. I am indebted to the following persons for helping me develop the ideas expressed in this article: Susanne Bergmann,
Owen Fiss, Darcy Galane, Mark Janis, Richard Kay, Detlef Lennen, Tom Morawetz,
Richard Parker, Jeremy Paul, Joel Paul, Ren6e Reich-Graffe, Tanina Rostain,
George Schatzki.
1. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT);
North American Free TradeAgreement (hereinafter NAFTA).
2. Lucie White rejects the instrumental view that regards procedure as "a technical problem". Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G," 38 BuFF. L. REv. 1 (1990). She thus
chastises proceduralists who disregard procedure's normative dimension. Id. In
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of patching together a series of legal devices to deal with a problem that has attained international prominence. In some cases,
these lawmakers take the mechanisms from a particular legal system-usually that of the dominant nations-and simply transpose them onto the international context, ignoring potential
contributions from other systems. 3 In other cases, the international legislators derive the new internationally constructed institutions almost randomly from different legal orders and fail to
generate a novel picture of law that is coherent in a thick sense,
i.e., in which the diverse legal components not only avoid direct
clashes but also reinforce each other. In both cases, there is no
critical evaluation of the fundamental premises upon which the
underlying national systems rest.
The process leading to the North American Free Trade
Agreement provides a case in point of the first kind, i.e. the
transposition of a dominant nation's mechanisms onto an international context. 4 The framers thoroughly and uncritically built
legal concepts imported from the United States into the Agreement's international legal apparatus. In this article, I will show
that this is so, at least with respect to the Agreement's procedural
dimension or, more specifically, with respect to the instruments
introduced to resolve antidumping and countervailing duties disputes. Though innovative in many respects, the panel procedure
established in the Agreement's Article 1904 to review final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations is essentially a
creature of United States law. It reproduces, often word for
word, U.S. federal procedural rules. More importantly, it reflects
a conception of procedure derived from the common law
tradition.
I will discuss antidumping and countervailing duties and the
Agreement's approach to such duties in section II. In the two
sections thereafter, I will demonstrate the pervasive influence of
the U.S. and common law procedure on the panel review system.
In section III, I will show how the Panel Rules reproduce, often
word for word, the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure. In section IV, I will argue that the Article 1904 procedure embodies the common law picture of procedure. 5 Inascontrast, I am criticizing international jurists here for their myopia. They cobble
together diverse legal contraptions and fail to give much though to the picture of law
to which they are unknowlingly giving birth.
3. See Angel R. Oquendo, NAFTA's Procedural Narrow-Mindedness: The
PanelReview of Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Determinations Under Chapter Nineteen, 11 C. J. INT'L LAW 61 (1995).
4. NAFrA, supra note 1.
5. In the context of this discussion, I will define a picture of procedure as an
interpretation of a procedural practice that represents but, at the same time, is
deeply embedded in that practice.
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much as it allows peremptory challenges in the panel selection
process, institutes a long-winded pleading phase, encourages detailed majority and dissenting opinions, establishes a thin scope
of appellate review, and requires participants to pay their own
attorney's fees, the panel review system reflects the influence of
the common law procedural picture, particularly as developed in
the United States. Moreover, the system follows fundamental
common law norms in presenting written procedural precepts as
an aggregation of discrete rules, in centering procedural activity
around a single (rather formal) oral proceeding, and in granting
participants rather than decision makers control over the
procedure.
I will then, in section V, present the predominant procedural
picture in the Mexican legal system and contrast that civil law
picture with the one prevailing in the United States. Mexico's
civil procedure contains nothing like the practice of peremptory
challenges, establishes a very limited pleading phase, does not
contemplate elaborate judicial opinions, provides for non-deferential appellate review, and often imposes attorney's fees on the
losing party. The Mexican procedural picture follows the civil
law tradition more basically inasmuch as its written precepts
form a systematically integrated code instead of a set of independent rules, rides on various (rather flexible) written and
oral communications, and expects the judge and not the parties
to direct the process.
After describing the Mexican picture of procedure, I will reassess (in section VI) the Article 1904 procedure from the comparative perspective. In other words, I will draw upon the
Mexican procedural picture in order to start imagining a new and
richer legal procedure. The article will next move to the critical
perspective, thus taking the exercise in imagination a step further. In section VII, I will cast a critical eye upon shared premises of the civil and common law procedural traditions. The
critical perspective ultimately points toward a vision of international procedure that transcends those two pictures.
The comparative approach does not simply consist of randomly selecting and combining diverse features derived from different procedural systems. Rather, it entails instead first
studying the different pictures immanently and contextually and
then reworking select elements of each into a coherent novel paradigm. It leads, in the best of cases, to the critical approach,
which calls into question even those elements shared by the various existing paradigms. The new international procedural picture will ultimately reject deeply held assumptions common to all
its national counterparts and even to previous international procedural regimes.
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Had the framers of the Article 1904 panel procedure taken
the comparative perspective, they would have been in a position
to design a procedure that coherently integrated elements of the
Mexican civil law approach to procedure,e.g., its flexible -and
business-like process or its thoroughly engaged decision maker,
with features of the United States. common law procedure already embedded in the panel review system such as the aversion
to imposing attorney's fees on the losing party and the insistence
on detailed, written justification for decisions. The critical perspective, in turn, would have enabled jurists to challenge premises shared by the two pictures, such as the assumption that legal
procedure's sole end is to resolve disputes. The framers would
have been able to see that an important, in fact, paradigmatic,
goal of international procedure is to reconfigure international
spaces, i.e., to alter radically the premises under which international actors interact in specific transnational contexts. The Article 1904 review system's main objective is to reconfigure the
space within which nations impose antidumping and countervailing duties to prevent the use of these duties to thwart free
trade. The critical approach would have made it possible systematically to build this goal into the procedure. This kind of a critical undertaking would have ultimately led beyond the exclusively
instrumental view, according to which procedure is taken to
serve particular ends, to a reflexive conception, which regards
procedure as having intrinsic value. The value of procedure
would thus be a function of not only the objectives advanced but
also the internal constitution of procedure, e.g., how it processes
the arguments made, how it treats the various actors, what kind
of power relations it supports.
Needless to say, there was no room for comparative or critical reflection in the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations. Mexico could not bring its peculiar civil law
viewpoint to the debate in part because it was a latecomer to the
bargaining table. The United States and Canada had already
worked out a dispute resolution scheme, as well as the essence of
the Agreement, in their prior Free Trade Agreement. As the
North American Free Trade Agreement's weakest party, Mexico
hardly could have forced its partners to change the structures already in place. The perception of the Mexican legal system as
inferior, of course, also contributed to the neglect of the Mexican
legal outlook.
A call for a critical reassessment of the panel review system
would have stood even less of a chance than a plea for the Mexicanization of that procedure from the comparative perspective.
Any such reconsideration would have required even more radical
changes in an atmosphere that was terribly hostile to altering the
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existing scheme. There was clearly no time or patience for critical suggestions.
In a sense, this kind of negotiation environment is rather
typical in international lawmaking. As explained in section VIII,
international actors negotiate international agreements under
pressure, with economic and political muscle steering the course.
It is unrealistic to expect international negotiators to take, on
their own, the comparative or the critical perspective. The
ground must be prepared. It is crucial to make space for any
such perspective long before the bargaining begins. Only thus
will there be a real chance of transforming international agreements along the lines suggested.
Of course, regardless of the stage in which it takes place, any
attempt to restructure international treaties from the comparative and critical perspective will run into impediments. It will be
vehemently opposed both out of ignorance and out of interest.
On the one hand, lacking a full understanding of the value of a
serious consideration of existing or potential alternative approaches, jurists may fail to either open their minds to previously
discarded national alternatives, or direct their imagination toward unprecedented international possibilities. On the other
hand, dominant international actors may have an interest in imposing their procedures in order better to control the internationalization process. Therefore, they will not hesitate to use
their upper hand to undermine any endeavor to bring in the comparative or the critical perspective.
A comparative and critical debate among scholars and practitioners would contribute significantly to overcoming the impediment of ignorance but minimally to removing the impediment of
interest. Making interest less of a factor in international agreements would require changing practical rather than theoretical
circumstances. A more balanced distribution of the international
political power, for instance, might preclude any single international actor from imposing its ways and thus help create a situation in which all national legal points of view have an equal
chance of influencing international law. Such a situation would
be ideal for the comparative perspective to flourish. And once
the comparative perspective takes hold, the prospects for the
adoption of the critical perspective improve. International actors
would have to adapt to a partially unfamiliar international legal
terrain anyway and would therefore have less aversion to the innovations that the critical perspective might effect. 6 By the same
6. There is, of course, the possibility that these actors might react to the initial
change with an adamant refusal to accept any additional alteration, especially of a
more fundamental kind. Yet, they will undoubtedly face a decreasing marginal cost
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token, a critical transformation of national legal paradigms
would probably facilitate an analogous critical effort at the international level: International actors would have less of a stake in

the international legal status quo. To be sure, any such national
critical legal transformation would also confront impediments of
ignorance and interest. The best hope would be to conduct the

national and the international critical campaigns simultaneously.
The two processes would thus reinforce and feed off of each

other.
A long and uncertain process of theoretical and practical de-

velopment must precede any fundamental change in the prevailing, relatively narrow approach to legal internationalization. In
the end, international actors might answer only partially, if at all,
the call for a comparative and critical reconstruction of international treaties. For instance, international jurists might come to
appreciate, but lack the will or the power to realize the promise

of radically restructured international agreements. Alternatively, international lawyers might adopt some comparative or
critical proposals but not others, while. struggling to stay as much
as possible within the bounds of coherence. At any rate, the project of comparative and critical reassessment cannot be telegraphed, let alone rushed, from the outset. Once set in motion,

the project develops a logic of its own and marches at its own
pace.
II. ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

AND NAFTA
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade defines dump-

ing as the practice "by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the
normal value of the products. ' '7 The Agreement identifies the

normal value primarily with the price charged "for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country."' 8
of adjustment to change, which will make it relatively inexpensive to embrace critical changes after the introduction of comparative changes.
7. GATT, supra note 1, at art. VI 1 1; See also GATT Agreement on Antidumping art. 2.1 (1994)("For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be
considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country
at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one
country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade,
for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.").
8. GATT, supra note 1, at art. VI I 1(a); See also GATr Agreement on Antidumping, supra note 7, at art. 2.4 ("A fair comparison shall be made between the
export price and the normal value. This comparison shall be made at the same level
of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as
possible the same time."). "[Iln the absence of such a domestic price," the GAIT
identifies the normal value with "the highest comparable price for the like product
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The Agreement adds the following qualification: "Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and
terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability." 9 The Agreement thereupon

empowers nations to impose antidumping duties: "In order to
offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any
dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount
than the margin of dumping in respect of such product."' 10
"Thus," in the words of international trade scholars Victor Carlos
Garcfa Moreno and Csar E. Hernindez Ochoa, "an anti-dumping duty brings the price of the merchandise to the price at which
it is sold in the exporting country's market.""
Article VI also authorizes nations to take action against
bounties or subsidies "granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of [any] product in the country of
origin or exportation, including any special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product.' 2 In these cases, the importing country may impose a countervailing duty up to "an amount
equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy.'

3

Garcfa Moreno and

Herndndez Ochoa explain that "a countervailing duty is applied
[to counterbalance] the subsidy granted to the product.'

4

Gen-

erally, a determination "that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten
for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade" or with "the cost of
production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonble addition for selling cost and profit." GATI art. VI 1(b).
9. GATT, supra note 1, at art. VI 1 1; See also GATT Agreement on Antidumping, supra note 7, at art. 2.4 ("Due allowance shall be made in each case, on
its merits, for differences which affect price comparability, including differences in
conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability.")(footnote omitted).
10. GATT, supra note 1, at art. VI 2.
11. Victor Carlos Garcia Moreno & C~sar E. Herndndez Ochoa, Neoprotectionism and Dispute Resolution Panels as Defense Mechanisms Against Unfair Trade
Practices: A Focus on Mexico, in MAKING FREE TRADE WORK IN THE AMERICAS
692, 699 (Boris Kozolchyk ed., 1993).
12. GATT, supra note 1, at art. VI 3.
13. Id. Article 2.4 of the GATT Agreement on Antidumping declares: "In the
cases referred to in paragraph 3, allowances for costs, including duties and taxes,
incurred between importation and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be
made. If in these cases price comparability has been affected, the authorities shall
establish the normal value at a level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the
constructed export price, or shall make due allowance as warranted under this paragraph. The authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is
necessary to ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden
of proof on those parties." GATI Agreement on Antidumping, supra note 7, at art.
2.4.
14. Moreno and Ochoa, supra note 11, at 699. See GATT, supra note 1, at art.
VI(2).
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material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as
to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry"
must precede
the imposition of antidumping and countervailing
5
duties."'
Antidumping and countervailing duties have been contro-

versial in part because of the widespread perception that they
tend to serve as barriers to trade. 16 That is, countries impose or
threaten to impose them on producers who have neither dumped
nor received a subsidy but who, due to their competitive edge,
threaten domestic production. 7 As a world leader in the use of

these duties, the United States has repeatedly faced accusations
of employing the duties to hinder free trade.' 8 When negotiating

15. GATr, Art. VI I 6(a). See GATT Agreement on Antidumping, supra note
7, at Art. 3.1 ("A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATi 1994
shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both
(a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on
prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of
these imports on domestic producers of such products.") This general requirement
may be waived by agreement of the contracting parties "so as to permit a contracting party to levy an antidumping or countervailingy duty on the importation of
any product for the purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidization which causes or
threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting party
exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting party."
GATI', supra note 1, at art. VI(6)(b). Subparagraph (c) allows contracting parties to
impose countervailing duties "for the purpose referred to in subparagraph (b)...
without the prior approval of the CONTRACTING PARTIES" if there are "exceptional circumstances... where delay might cause damage which would be difficult to
repair" and if the duty is "reported immediately to the CONTRACTING PARTIES." Id. at art. VI(6)(c). If the contracting parties disapprove "the countervailing duty shall be withdrawn promptly." Id.
16. Moreno and Ochoa, supra note 11, at 700 ("Since the 1980's, countervailing and anti-dumping duties have proven to be subtantial barriers to trade and
among the most contentious issues of free trade."). Garcia Moreno and Herndndez
Ochoa see a neoprotectionist trend in the use of antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations as non-tariff trade barriers. Id. at 692, 94 ("evidence of neoprotectionism can be found in the increase in non-tariff barriers to international
trade") ("non-tariff barriers include.., unfair anti-dumping or countervailing duties
or procedures"). See also Rodolfo Cruz Miramontes, The Mexican Law of Unfair
Trade Practices-A Synopsis, MAKING FREE TRADE WORK IN THE AMERICAS, supra

note 11, 648, 658 ("In the final analysis, any countervailing duty is a protectionist
measure.").
17. Moreno and Ochoa, supra note 11, at 693 ( "Since the 1970's... there was a
marked increase in non-tariff barriers, due mainly to the adverse reaction by those
sectors of the economy (mostly labor and management) affected by imports from
nations that were previously only marginal exporters. The affected sectors were
quick to ask for protection.") (footnote omitted).
18. See e.g., Rodolfo Cruz Miramontes, Legal Aspects of International Trade:
Regulation and Effect Particularlyon Mexico-United States Relations, Tim NEw FOREIGN TRADE L. 181, 193 (Mexican Bar Association 1987) ("The domestic North
American producer, more inefficient day after day, attributed great importance and
to some degree even necessity to the invocation of these protectionist measures,
even without justification, and the government is increasingly concerned about the
development of international trade.").
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the 1989 Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Canadian government was particularly concerned that the United
States was relying on those duties to keep Canadian products out

of the United States market. 19 The Canadian government first
20
sought an exemption from those duties for Canadian products.
The United States government made it clear that such a blanket
exemption or any dilution of U.S. trade law was simply out of the
question. The United States' position was that for free trade to
2
prosper it was crucial to check dumping and unfair subsidies. '
These unfair trade practices, the U.S. government insisted, constitute an abuse of, and therefore damp the enthusiasm for, free
22
trade.
One way out of this impasse would have been to arrive at a
common set of standards stringent enough to deter dumping and
subsidizing but also specific enough to keep the authorities from
manipulating the system to hamper free commercial exchange.
19. See, e.g., RALPH H. FOLSOM & W. DAVIS FOSLOM, UNDERSTANDING
NAFFA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL BusINEss IMPLICATIONS 112 (1996) (Canadian

"products had been repeatedly hit by the United States trade protection actions,
many of which seemed arbitrary to the Canadians. If free trade access to the U.S.
market was to be genuinely insured, something had to be done."); M. Jean Anderson & Jonathan T. Fried, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in the United StatesCanada Free Trade Agreement, in THE U.S./CANADA TRADE AGREEMENT 133, 142

(Judith Hippler Bello & Homer E. Moyer, Jr. Eds. 1989)("Canada viewed the U.S.
[countervailing duty] law as a significant obstacle to securing access to the U.S.
market".).
20. See Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade Agreements and the Federal Courts:
Emerging Issues, ST. MARY'S L. J. 353, 359-60 (1996)("In negotiations over the
CFTA, Canada sought substantive changes in United States trade law to address
what Canada viewed as unfair bias against Canadian firms and a lack of impartiality
by United States courts in reviewing administrative agency determinations."). By
refusing to do away with antidumping and countervailing duties within the free
trade block, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and later the North
American Free Trade Agreement, rejected the approach of the European Union.
See RALPH H. FOLSOM & W. DAViS FOSLOM, supra note 19, at 220-21. Andreas F.

Lowenfeld argues that while it may be possible to do away with antidumping duties
on trade between the United States and Canada, countervailing duties would be
extremely hard to do away with: "It seems likely that some kind of anti-subsidy law
will remain even when all customs duties between the United States and Canada are
eliminated; it is less obvious that an anti-dumping law is necessary for goods moving
in a single market." Andreas F. Lowenfeld, BinationalDispute Settlement under
Chapter 19 of the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 269, 336 (1991).
21. See Robert P. Deyling, supra note 20, at 360("The United States would not
agree to change its trade laws and wished to avoid weakening existing trade law as
interpreted by United States courts.").
22. "Many in the United States viewed Canadian federal and provincial governments as prolific susidizers whose programs often distort trade and place U.S. industries at a competititve disadvantage." M. Jean Anderson & Jonathan T. Fried,
Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, in THE U.S./CANADA TRADE AGREEMENT 133, 142 (Judith Hippler Bello &

Homer E. Moyer, Jr. eds. 1989).
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However, both governments soon realized that their sharply divergent views on these unfair trading practices precluded any
quick development of common standards.2 3 Therefore they
struck a deal, according to which each country would essentially
preserve its laws regarding antidumping and countervailing duties but allow binational panels to review final determinations.2 4
They declared the panel review procedure temporary with the
hope that there would eventually be a meeting of minds on antidumping and countervailing duties. 25 Commentators have
26
praised this binding procedure as well as its implementation.
23. See, e.g. M. Jean Anderson & Jonathan T. Fried, Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in the United States-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, THE U.S./CANADA
TRADE AGREEMENT 133, 144 (Judith Hippler Bello & Homer E. Moyer, Jr. eds.
1989)("Given the complexity of the subsidies issue, the different viewpoits on the
legitimacy of subsidies and countervailing duties, and the imperfect match between
the two [666], it proved impossible to reach a subsidies agreement in the context and
time frame of the negotiations."); Debra P. Steger, The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the Canada-U.S.Free Trade Agreement: Comparisonwith the Existing Systems, in UNDERSTANDING THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 49, 51 (Donald M. McRae
& Debra P. Steger eds., 1988).
24. Deyling, supra note 20, at 360 ("The binational panel scheme is an outgrowth of this disagreement [over trade law on dumping and subsidies], and represents a political compromise adopted to gain support for the CFTA.").
25. See Deyling, supra note 20, at 360 ("The United States and Canada intended
to follow the CFTA with negotiations over a new system of antidumping and countervailing duty principles that would eventually eliminate the need for national laws
on those issues. Pending the negotiation of such 'substitute rules,' and in any event
for a maximum of seven years, the countries agreed to use the binational panel process.")(footnotes omitted); RALPH H. FOLSOM & W. DAVIS FOSLOM, supra note 19,
at 221 ("A working group created at Canada's insistence will consider harmonization possibilities.").
26. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Esq., "Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels
as the Trade Courts of Last Resort", 6 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. 9, 13 (1994)("Many
might now agree that the Chapter 19 approach to dispute settlement, particularly in
the contentious area of antidumping and countervailing duty law, is not a modest
innovation. A commitment to be bound by binational decisions made by five-member panels that bridge different legal cultures but apply the law of just one is a long
step from appellate review.... The promise of Chapter 19 is that it will come to be
a mutually acceptable means of resolving inflammatory economic conflicts among
the three Parties. Under NAFTA, the panel process will build on the experience
gained under the CFTA. If it becomes fully institutionalized, the Chapter 19 process
could ultimately inspire a new effort to achieve the objective that has substantially
eluded the Uruguay Round and been formally abandoned in the NAFTA-the development of a new set of rules on dumping and subsidies that is comprehensive, precise, and mutually agreed."); Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute
Settlement, "American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice
Reports to the House of Delegates," 26 INT'L LAW. 855, 865 (1992)("Whether of not
[the binational panel system] is altogether logical and whether or not it responds
fully to the real legal difficulties in the trade relationship, as between Canada and
the United States, experience has shown that the system works."); Lowenfeld, supra
note 20, at 334. ("All things considered, the unique binational dispute settlement
mechanisms created by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement have
worked extraordinarily well. Surprisingly, the Chapter 19 procedures, involving at
least one and usually two or more private parties in a quasi-judicial setting, have
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As it strove to become part of the North American trade
block, the Mexican government had concerns similar to those of
its Canadian counterpart. It also felt that the United States was
unfairly employing antidumping and countervailing duties to exclude Mexican products. 27 It therefore sought inclusion in the
panel review procedure. 28 The U.S. and Canadian governments
were initially reluctant to accede to this demand. 29 The Mexican
government, however, insisted vehemently on this point and the
U.S. and Canadian governments eventually yielded. 30 Thus the
North American Free Trade Agreement ended up with Chapter
been more successful than the Chapter 18 procedures, involving only governments.
In both sets of procedures, the panelists have been thoughtful; their opinions have
been thorough and articulate, and their conclusions on the whole persuasive."). See
also GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT 1,
102 & 104 (1993). But cf Robert E. Hudec, The FTA Provisions on Dispute Settlement: The Lessons of the GATT Experience, IN UNDERSTANDING THE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 41 ("The Chapter 19 procedure is a delicate hybrid
that owes its existence to the very unusual context of AD/CVD issues in the negotiations; while it is a nice piece of work that can probably achieve its objectives if not
taxed too hard or too often, in the long run I feel certain that Chapter 19 will end up
hanging from the ceiling of ... some legal museum.").
27. Moreno and Ochoa, supra note 11, at 702 ("Developing nations such as
Mexico have adopted an economic development plan which is heavily dependent on
exports. As a result, Mexico's industrial sector is highly vulnerable to the U.S. imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. Unlike the industries of developed
countries, Mexico's industry does not have a sufficiently large internal marketplace
to absorb the volumes of production lost to U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing
duties.").
28. See Lisa B. Koteen, Life after NAFTA: Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings under Chapter Nineteen of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 863 PLI/CoRP 841 (1994) ("During negotiations for the North
American Free Trade Agreement ('NAFTA' or 'the Agreement'), Mexican negotiators made clear that extension of the binational panel system to Mexico was one of
their main goals." Moreno and Ochoa explain, more generally, that "[i]nternational
trade remains one of Mexico's most imortant developmental goals, and any
problems in attaining greater trade liberalization, to the extent they affect Mexico's
products or services, are also increasinly important to Mexico. Hence, one of the
most important items on Mexico's trade agenda is foreign non-tariff barriers."
Moreno and Ochoa, supra note 11, at 695.
29. Miramontes, supra note 16, at 662. ("Initially, the U.S. and Canada objected
ot chapter 19.").
30. See Robert E. Burke & Brian F. Walsh, NAFTA Binational Panel Review:
Should It Be Continued, Eliminated or Substantially Changed?, 20 BROOK. J.INT'L
L. 529, 534 (1995) ("The final and most compelling point in favor of the continued
existence of the panels is the fact that they were necessary components of the CFTA
and NAFI'A: since Canada and Mexico would not have become parties to these
trade agreements without the inclusion of these dispute settlement procedures, a
powerful incentive was provided for the establishment of the panels and, presently,
for their continuance."); Lisa B. Koteen, Life after NAFTA: Review of Antidumping
and CountervailingDuty Proceedings under ChapterNineteen of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 863 PLI/CoRP 841 (1994) ("The United States was willing to
include Mexico in the process, as was Canada, but exacted certain commitments
from Mexico to reform its administrative procedures in antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings and also demanded a number of key modifications to
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Nineteen, which is quite similar to Chapter Nineteen of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. 31 The review system
became permanent when national parties abandoned the goal of
arriving at transnational standards on antidumping and counter32
vailing duties.
In the words of Homer E. Moyer, Jr.,
The binational panel process of Chapter 19 will in many respects be the crucible of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). As the vehicle for resolving antidumping and countervailing duty cases brought in any of the three
contracting countries, Chapter 19 panels will be required to
deal with the types of trade conflicts that have historically
gen33
erated intense, sometimes passionate, controversy.
Chapter Nineteen establishes a review procedure for final
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations imposed by
34
any of the parties on the products of any of the other parties.
Chapter 19. Chapter 19 of the CFTA has now been replaced by Chapter 19 of the
NAFTA.")(footnote omitted).
31. Lisa B. Koteen, Life after NAFTA: Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedingsunder Chapter Nineteen of the North American Free Trade

Agreement, 863 PLI/CoRP, 841 (1994) ("Chapter 19 largely duplicates its CFTA
counterpart"); LESLIE ALAN GLICK, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 83 (2nd ed. 1994); Miramontes, supra note 16, at 662.
Ralph H.. Folsom and W. Davis Folsom point to four innovations in Chapter
Nineteen of the North American Free Trade Agreement. "One change that NAFTA
does make is to favor the inclusion of judges and retired judges on the roster of
acceptable Chapter 19 panelists.... A second change... is the possibility of consultations and 'special committee' review in situations where there are fundamental
failures in the dispute settlement process.... A third change involves amendments
to national antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Each country may amend its
laws consistently with the GATIT, its Codes and the NAFTA objective of maintaining 'effective and fair' rules in these areas.... Finally, NAFTA adds an example of
when a panel manifestly exceeds its powers, authority or jurisdiction; 'for example
by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review."' Folsom & Foslom, supra
note 19, at 219-21. (footnotes omitted).
32. Deyling, supra note 20, at 361.("Ultimately, the substitute rules were never
adopted, and the binational panel system became permanent when it was incorporated into the NAFTA in 1994. Under the NAFTA, there is no limit on the duration
of the binational panel system, nor is there any requirement for the development of
a new system of antidumpoing and countervailing duty rules for the United States,
Canada, and Mexico.")(footnote omitted); LESLIE ALAN GLICK, UNDERSTANDING
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 80 (2nd ed. 1994) ("A basic
change is that the bi-national panels themselves, which were temporary under FTA,
are now permanent."); RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., THE NAFTA: WHAT'S IN,
WHAT'S OUT, WHAT'S NEXT (1994) ("The NAFTA has dropped the FTA requirement for a working group to develop a substitute system of rules for dealing with
unfair pricing and government susidization.") Hufbauer and Schott point out that
"the three countries did commit to consider reform of subsidy and antidumping
practices in future work of the NAFTA Trade Commission." Hufbauer & Schott,
supra note 26, at 102.
33. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Esq., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: BinationalPanels as
the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707 (1993).
34. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904.

1997]

PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

217

Upon the request of any person entitled to judicial review of the
determination, a binational panel conducts the review. Participants may appeal panel decisions to an extraordinary challenge
fundacommittee only if the panel is guilty of gross misconduct,
35
mental procedural error, or exceeding its authority.
The panel decides whether the determination "was in accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the
importing Party,"' 3 6 i.e., of the country where the investigating
authority sits.
For this purpose, the antidumping or countervailing duty law
consists of the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations,
administrative practice and judicial precedents to the extent
that a court of the importing Party would rely on such materials in reviewing a37final determination of the competent investigating authority.
The panel, in addition, has to follow the standard of review
of the national court that would ordinarily review the final determination. The panel, hence, must not only review the final determinations against the same antidumping and countervailing duty
rules and but also grant the same degree of deference as an ordinary national court would. 38 The panel review is substantively
equivalent to ordinary judicial review. What varies is the identity
39
of the decision maker and the applicable procedural law.
The binational panel review procedure is set forth generally
41
40
in Article 1904 of the Agreement. Pursuant to Article 1904,
35. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904 §13; NAFTA Annex 1904.13.
2.
36. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904
37. NAFTA, Art. 1904 T 2.
38. The Agreement provides that the panel must apply the same standard of
review and "general legal principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise
would apply to a review of a determination of the competent investigating authority." Id. It defines the standard of review by reference to the statutes that establish
the standard of review for the respective domestic courts in Canada, the United
States, and Mexico. The Senate Joint Report on NAFTA declared "that the
NAFTA, just as the CFI'A, [ i.e., the Free Trade Agreement between the United
States and Canada], requires binational panels to apply the same standards of review
and general legal principles that domestic courts would apply. This requirement is
the foundation of the binational panel system .... [Failure] to apply the appropriate
standard of review, potentially undermine[s] the integrity of the binational panel
process." Senate Joint Committee Report, North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, S. REP. No. 189, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 42 (1993).
39. See Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Esq., Chapter19 of the NAFTA: BinationalPanels
as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 4 No. 6 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. 9, 12 (1994)("In
reviewing antidumping and countervailing duty determinations, panels stand in the
shoes of the domestic reviewing court that would otherwise decide the case."); Senate Joint Committee Report, supra note 38, at 43-44. ("the central tenet of Chapter
19 is that a panel must operate precisely as would the court it replaces").
40. For a detailed exposition of the procedures see Oquendo, supra note 3, at
66-78.
41. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904 § 14.
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the parties adopted "the NAFTA Article 1904 Panel Rules" to

specify the details of this procedure. In case of any inconsistency
between the Panel Rules and Article 1904, or any other part of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Agreement
prevails. 42 Procedural questions not covered by the rules may be
resolved by analogy to the rules or by reference to the rules of
procedure of the court that would otherwise have jurisdiction to
review the administrative determination. 43 Moreover, "a panel

may adopt its own internal procedures.., for routine administrative matters," as long as those procedures are not inconsistent
with the 1904 Panel Rules. 44
One objective in creating the binational review option was
to augment the speed of appealing final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. 45 The Agreement in conjunction

with the Panel Rules sets forth a strict timetable. The Agreement specifically requires that the rules be designed "to result in

final decisions within 315 days of the date on which a request for

a panel is made". 46 Figure 1 provides an overview of the proce47
dure's time frame and different stages.

42. 1904 Panel R. 2; Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel Reviews, US-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 59 Fed. Reg 5892 (1994).
43. 1904 Panel R. 2.
44. 1904 Panel R. 17.
45. Moyer, supra note 33, at 716. ("A principal objective of the compromise
that became Chapter 19 of the CFTA was the desire to see trade disputes between
the two countries resolved expeditiously."). See also Deyling, supra note 30, at 363.
("[B]ecause panelists work under tight deadlines, they may reach decisions more
quickly than the national courts they replace.")(footnote omitted); Burke & Walsh,
supra note 30, at 530. ("One of the primary benefits of panel review under the
CFTA is expeditious review. The CFTA established specific time limits to which all
parties and panel members were required to adhere."); Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Esq.,
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: BinationalPanels as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 4
No. 6 MEx. TRADE & L. REp. 9, 12 (1994). Burke and Walsh nonetheless note "that
the advantages of the above-cited time limits as compared to the procedures of the
Court of International Trade (CIT) have been significantly undercut as a result of
changes which have been made to the Rules of the Court of International Trade."
Id. at 531-32. They explain that CIT rules have been amended to incoporate time
limits similar to those of the panel procedure. They point at two additional facts that
make it unclear whether the panel procedure will be speedier than the CIT procedure. First, the former will tend to be more cumbersome to the extent that a panel
has the authority not to reverse but only to remand a determination, whereas the
CIT may straightaway reverse determinations before it. Second, a panel's decision
will tend to become effective more quickly than that of the CIT insofar as it may be
reviewed only in very limited circumstances, i.e., when an extraordinary challenge
committe finds a panel guilty of gross misconduct, of fundamental procedural error,
or of exceeding its authority. Id.
46. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1904
14.
47. See also Burke & Walsh, supra note 30, at 53-31.
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FIGURE 1. FINAL AD/CD DETERMINATION REVIEW
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Once one of the Agreement's government party requests a
binational panel, usually at the behest of the person entitled to

judicial review of the determination,the pleading phase is set in
motion. The instigating participant files a complaint. The adversaries, in turn, submit a responsive pleading called a "notice of
appearance."' 48 The participants may also make motions. 49 After
the investigating authority forwards the administrative record,
48. 1904 Panel R. 40; 59 FR 5901.

49. 1904 Panel R. 61; 59 FR 5903.
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the panel review procedure shifts to appellate mode. The partici-

pants write complainant, response, and reply briefs. 50 The panel
holds a pre-hearing conference and then oral argument. 51 Finally, the panel announces its decision in writing. 52
The assemblage of this procedure took place while the free
trade effort concerned only the United States and Canada. Not

surprisingly, the procedure reflects those countries' interests. For
instance, the Rules allow the use of English or French when a
panel reviews a determination made in Canada. Rule 29 de-

clares: "Either English or French may be used by any person or

panelist in any document or oral proceeding. ' 53 Further, if legal
issues of "general public interest or importance" are involved or

if the proceedings are conducted, at least in part, in both languages, there must be simultaneous translation and the panel or54
ders must be made available in both English and French.
Virtually all of Mexico's over ninety million inhabitants
speak Spanish, whereas extremely few speak fluent English.
Hence, there is as much need to accommodate the Spanish language as the French. Yet, there is no provision whatsoever for
the use of the Spanish language in the proceedings to review de-

terminations made in Mexico. 55 The absence of a specific provision on language in panel reviews of Mexican final
determinations is most probably a consequence of the fact that

50. 1904 Panel R. 57.
51. 1904 Panel R. 66 & 67; 59 FR 5904.
52. NAFrA, supra note 1, at annex 1901.2 915 ("The panel shall issue a written
decision with reasons, together with any dissenting or concurring opinions of the
panelists."). See also 1904 Panel R. 72.
53. 1904 Panel R. 29; 59 FR 5899.
54. 1904 Panel R. 30 & 31; 59 FR 5899. The complaint as well as all notice of
appearances must specify whether the person "intends to use English or French in
pleadings and oral proceedings before the panel" and "requests simultaneous translation of any oral proceedings." 59 FR 5901; 1904 Panel R. 39(2)(d); & 39(2)(d)(ii).
See also 1904 Panel R. (Schedule-Procedural Forms) Form(3) & Form(4); 59 FR
5907.
55. See generally Lisa B. Koteen, Life after NAFTA: Review of Antidumping
and CountervailingDuty Proceedings under ChapterNineteen of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 863 PLI/Copa, 841 (1994)("The question of translation remains open. How will American or Canadian panelists fare when reviewing Mexican cases? How will Mexicans handle cases in English? Will there ever be a
safeguard proceeding and, if so, how well will it work? These are some of the
unknowns. Of course, procedural rules and regulations can be amended to correct
unforeseen and unforeseable problems that inevitably arise."); Moyer, supra note
33, at 714. ("In the case of the NAFTA panels involving Mexico, panelists will be
required to bridge even wider cultural and legal gaps. Unlike both Canada and the
United States, Mexico is a civil law country, not a common law country. In addition,
Mexico does not have the trade law history and experience of either the United
States or Canada. Language differences will present new challenges generally not
encountered in CFrA proceedings. In these respects NAFTA panels will face new
complications.").
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the Rule drafters essentially copied the Panel Rules designed for
the 1989 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.5 6 In all
likelihood, the drafters simply did not give enough thought to the
extent to which the original Rules had to be modified before being applied to a different kind of proceeding.
Moreover, Canadian law probably safeguards the right to
use the French language far more zealously than Mexican law
protects the right to use Spanish. For instance, the Canadian
"Official Languages Act" declares English and French official
languages and specifically orders "every judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative body... established by or pursuant to an Act of
Parliament" to make sure that at its central office "members of
the public can obtain available services from it and can communicate with it in both official languages."5 7 Mexico has no
equivalent statute.
In any case, in reviewing Mexican final determinations,
panels may adopt an approach to incorporate Spanish speakers
parallel to that established to include Francophones in Canadian
panel review proceedings. Rule 2 declares, as already noted,
that procedural questions not covered by the Rules may be resolved by analogy to the Rules.5 8 In fact, the wisest approach
would be to provide for the use of English, Spanish, and French
in all panel review proceedings.
The language issue is not in itself crucial. It acquires importance as a symptom of a larger problem with the panel review
system as a whole. The system completely disregards the Mexican viewpoint. It makes no attempt to accommodate Mexican
needs or potential contributions. In the next section, I will show
that the Article 1904 procedure draws much of its content from
U.S. law. Thereafter, in section IV, I will contend that the procedure's main concepts derive from the common law tradition, of
which both the United States and Canada are part.5 9 In section
56. Compare North American Free Trade Agreement: Rules for Article 1904
Binational Panel Reviews, 59 Fed. Reg. 8686 (1994) with Binational Panel Reviews
and Extraordinary Challenge Committees: United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, 53 Fed. Reg. 53212 (1988). See Stacy J. Ettinger, NAFTA Chapter
Nineteen: Rules of Procedureand Regulations, 863 PLI/CORP 809 (1994)("The rules
of procedure for binational panel review and for extraordinary challenge committee
review largely duplicate the CFrA rules of procedure amended just prior to negotiation of the NAFTA rules of procedure.")(citing United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement: Amendments to Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel
Reviews, 59 Fed. Reg. 5892 (1994) and United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Amendments to Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Extraordinary Challenge
Committees, 59 Fed. Reg. 5910 (1994)).
57. Official Languages Act. R.S.C. 1985, c.0-3, s.10.
58. 1904 Panel R. 2; 59 FR 5895.
59. Only Anglo-Canadian civil procedure belongs to the common law tradition.
Quebecois civil procedure has to a great extent remained true to its civil law roots.
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V, I will maintain that the framers failed to take into account the
radically different Mexican civil law standpoint.
III.

THE REPRODUCTION OF U.S. PROCEDURAL
DETAILS

The Panel Rules are, in fact, a creature of U.S. law. Relying
on its superior bargaining position, the United States imposed its
procedural norms in the earlier free trade negotiations with Canada. Access to the larger United States market was more important to the Canadian industry than access to the smaller
Canadian market was to the United States industry. More specifically, however, the dynamics of the negotiation led to a situation
in which Canada was mainly interested in having a panel review
system for antidumping and countervailing duties, almost irrespective of that system's details. As already noted, Canada insisted on protection (if not exemption) from duties imposed by
the United States. The Canadian government had to use up its
bargaining chips to make a reluctant United States government
agree to have those duties reviewed by binational panels. Thereafter it was hardly in a position to make strong demands with
respect to the particular form that the panel review procedure
was to take.
Mexico's situation was even more precarious than Canada's.
Its general bargaining position was clearly weaker than that of
Canada. Mexico required access to the other North American
economies even more urgently than Canada had needed access
to the United States economy. To make matters worse for Mexico, Canada and the United States were quite wary about the
prospect of integrating their economies with the less efficient,
low-wage Mexican economy. 60 More specifically, Mexico possibly had to spend more of its bargaining capital to join the panel
review regime than Canada. The negotiators from the north
were loath to expand the scheme to include the final determinations of a jurisdiction that diverged radically from their AngloAmerican systems and that they perceived as backward. 6 1 Also,
60. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey Schott note that NAFrA is "the first reciprocal free trade pact between a developing country and industrial countries." Hufbauer & Schott, supra note 26, at 1. Folsom & Foslom report that the Canadian
government was less interested in free trade relations with Mexico than the U.S.
government: The Canadians "had no real need or preference for free trade with
Mexico, but did no wish to be left out of negotiations that might dilute or adversely
impact CFrA." Folsom & Foslom, supra note 19, at 119.
61. See Hufbauer & Schott, supra note 26 at 103. ("During the negotiations,
questions were raised as to whether the Mexican legal system could accommodate
the FTA procedures and provide sufficient basis for the review of final determinations by Mexican officials."). Hufbauer & Schott "believe these concerns have been
assuaged by Mexico's commitment in the NAFTA to overhaul its trade laws and
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since its establishment, the panel review regime had given rise to
considerable skepticism in the United States because of the perception that it operated against U.S. interests. 62 Having pressed
intensely for admission, the Mexican government was not in a
position to demand significant changes in the content of that
regime.
The Mexican government's comparative disadvantage was,
hence, greater than that of its Canadian counterpart in the earlier
negotiations. Mexico had to fight harder for inclusion into the
Agreement and into the panel review system than Canada. It
was less able to make demands with respect to the details of that
system. More importantly, it came on board when the panel procedure not only was already in place but also had been operating
for several years. The Mexican representatives were in this sense
worse off than their Canadian counterparts, who got involved in
the process before the establishment of an antidumping and
countervailing duty review scheme.
It is impossible to exaggerate the extent to which the 1904
Panel Rules bear the imprint of U.S. law. The organization of
the Rules is remarkably similar to the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Panel Rules break down into several parts,
which resemble the headings that divide the federal rules. Figure
2 shows how even the sequence is quite similar. Only the Federal
Rules section addressing "parties" has no equivalent in the Panel
Rules. The Panel Rules describe the party-configuration 63briefly
in the preamble, under "Definitions and Interpretation.

procedures. In particular, Mexico has agreed to undertake significant legal and judicial reforms to provide due process guarantees and effective judicial review for disputing parties. These reforms should create greater transparency in the application
and administration of Mexican trade laws and enable Mexico to follow the adminstrative practices and procedures that were already established for chapter 19 panels
under the Canada-US FTA. " Id. at 103.
62. FOLSOM & FoSLOM, supra note 19, at 115.
63. In addition to the involved NAFTA parties and the investigating authority,
the participants in the proceeding are interested persons, i.e., persons "who, pursuant to the laws of the country in which a final determination was made, would be
entitled to appear and be represented in a judicial review of the final determination." 1904 PR 3; 59 FR 5896 (Definitions and Interpretation) "participant", "interested person".
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FIGURE 2: 1904 PANEL RULES AND U.S. FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
1904 Panel Review Rules
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Beyond a general structure, the 1904 Panel Rules duplicate,
often word for word, many particular elements of the United
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The Panel Rules delineate a hybrid procedure with
the initial pleading phase derived from U.S. federal trial practice
and the second phase of briefs and oral argument based on U.S.
federal appellate practice. The extent to which they resemble the
federal rules is astonishing.
Rule 2 of the Panel Rules, for example, enunciates: "The
purpose of these Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive review of final determinations .. .."64 The framers clearly
borrowed this language from Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which declares that the Rules "shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. ' 65 Even in setting its purpose the panel
review procedure simply imitates the United States civil procedural system.
There are, of course, many more similarities. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Appellate Procedure
state that a court may adopt "Rules governing its practice not
64. 1904 Panel R. 2; 59 FR 5895.
65. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
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inconsistent with these Rules. '66 Panel Rule 17(1), for its part,
declares: "A panel may adopt its own internal procedures, not
inconsistent with these Rules, for routine administrative matters."'67 In addition, the Panel Rule on computation of time is
very similar to its counterpart in both sets of federal rules. That
is, all three regimes first establish that a time period excludes the
day of the event that sets off the time clock but includes the last

go on to explain the conditions for
day of that period and then
68

extending a time period.
Moreover, section 3 of Panel Rule 55, requiring every pleading to be signed either by counsel or by a pro se participant, has
its mirror image in Federal Rule 11.69 More significantly, the

pleadings in both procedural schemes are quite similar in content. The complaint and the responsive pleading mainly consist
70
in a statement of the person's claim and a demand for relief,

while motions essentially include 71a statement of the supporting

grounds and the proposed order.
The briefs allowed in panel reviews are the same as the ones

used in federal appellate procedure. There is a brief by the petitioner, a brief by the respondent, and then a reply brief by the
petitioner. 72 Like the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Panel
See FED. R. CIv. P. 83; FED. R. App. P. 47.
67. 1904 Panel R. 17(1); 59 FR 5898.
68. 1904 Panel R. 19 & 20; 59 FR 5898; FED. R. Civ. P. 6; FED. R. App. P. 26.
69. Compare 1904 Panel R. 58(3); 59 FR 5903 ("Every pleading filed on behalf
of a participant in a panel review shall be signed by counsel for the participant or,
where the participant is not represented by counsel, by the participant.") with FED.
R. CIv. P. 11 ("Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's
address.").
70. Compare 1904 Panel R. 39(2); 59 FR 5900 ("Every Complaint... shall contain the following information": "the precise nature of the Complaint, including the
applicable standard of review and the allegations of errors of fact or law, including
challenges to the jurisdiction of the investigating authority" and "a statement
describing the interested person's entitlement to file a Complaint".) and 1904 Panel
R. 40(1); 59 FR 5901 (The "Notice of Appearance" shall contain "a statement as to
the basis for the person's claim of entitlement to file a Notice of Appearance" and
"a statement as to whether appearance is made" in support of opposition to the
complaint.) with FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading" shall contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand
for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks."). The notice of appearance, however,
is somewhat simpler than an answer or a motion for intervention. See Burke &
Walsh, supra note 30, at 533.
71. Compare 1904 Panel R. 63 ("Every Notice of Motion ...shall be accompanied by a proposed order of the panel" and "shall contain ... a statement of the
grounds to be argued".) with FED R. Civ. P. 8(a)(The motion generally "shall state
the grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order sought".). See also FED.
R. App. P. 27(a).
72. Compare 1904 Panel R. 60(1, 2, & 3) with FED. R. App. P. 28(a,b, & c).
66.
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Rules also provide for amicus curiae briefs, though in more lim73
ited circumstances.
The Panel Rules define the content of the briefs in virtually
the same way as the Rules of Appellate Procedure describe the
brief of the appellant. The Panel Rules require five parts: (1)
Table of contents and table of authorities; (2) Statement of the
74
case; (3) Statement of the issues; (4) Argument; and (5) Relief.
The brief of the appellant in federal appellate proceedings must
have five identical headings. 75 Both sets of rules also coincide in
mandating that briefs include an appendix including the authorities referenced. 76 They also contain almost identical provisions
on joint briefs. Panel Rule 60(5) reads: "Any number of participants may join in a single brief and any participant may adopt by
reference any part of the brief of another participant. ' 77 Appellate procedure Rule 28(i) dictates that "any number of either
[appellants or appellees] may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief
'78
of another.
The prehearing conference in a binational panel review is
hard to distinguish from that in a federal appeal. Panel Rule 66
affirms:
(3) The purpose of a pre-hearing conference shall be to facilitate the expeditious advancement of the panel review by addressing such matters as: (a) the clarification and
simplification of the issues; (b) the procedure to be followed at
the hearing of oral argument; and (c) any outstanding
motions....
(5) Following a pre-hearing conference, the panel shall
promptly issue an order setting out its rulings with respect to
the matters considered at the conference.
In the same vein, prior to its 1994 revision,79 appellate procedure
Rule 33 dictated that
73. FED. R. App. P. 29 permits amicus curiae to file briefs generally when the
parties consent or when the court grants leave. 1904 Panel R. 60(7), in contrast,
simply states that in a review of a determination made by a United States investigating authority, another investigating authority, which has made a determination involving the same goods and related issues, "may file an amicus curiae brief."
74. 1904 Panel R. 62.
75. FED. R. App. P. 28. In 1991, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were
amended to require an additional heading on subject matter and appellate
jurisdiction.
76. Compare 1904 Panel R. 60 with FED. R. App. P. 30.
77. 1904 Panel R. 60(5).
78. FED. R. App. P. 28(i).
79. Now the rule reads: "The court may direct the attorneys, and in appropriate
cases the parties, to participate in one or more conferences to address any matter
that may aid in the disposition of the proceedings, including the simplification of the
issues and the possibility of settlement. A conference may be conducted in person
or by telephone and be presided over by a judge or other person designated by the
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a prehearing conference to consider the simplification of the
issues and such other matters as may aid in the deposition of
the proceeding by the court. The court or judge shall make an
80
order which recites the action taken at the conference ....
This rule defines the purpose of the prehearing conference somewhat more generally than the Panel Rule. Yet, the conferences
in both procedures perform the same role in essentially the same
way.
The framers unquestionably modeled the panel review oral
hearing after the oral argument in federal appellate procedure.
The usual format, including the order of the argument, is basically that employed by United States Courts of Appeal. First,
the petitioner's side makes its oral argument. Second, the respondents present their side of the argument. And, third, petitioners argue in rebuttal. 81 Upon describing the oral argument,
Panel Rule 67 avers:
If a participant fails to appear at oral argument, the panel may
hear argument on behalf of the participants who are present.
If no participant82 appears, the panel may decide the case on the
basis of briefs.

Making the same point more circuitously, appellate procedure
Rule 34(e) reads:
If the appellee fails to appear to present argument, the court
will hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present. If
the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on
behalf of the appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the
case will be8 3decided on the briefs unless the court shall otherwise order.

Regardless of whether all or some of the participants show up,
the panels run oral proceedings from the same script as federal
appellate courts.
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMON LAW
PROCEDURAL PICTURE
Naturally, Article 1904 and the Panel Rules have assimilated, along with the details, the underlying conceptions of
United States procedural law. James F. Smith has made the following comments regarding the procedure for safeguarding the
panel review system set forth in Article 1905:
court for that purpose. Before a settlement conference, attorneys must consult with
their clients and obtain as much authority as feasible to settle the case. As a result
of a conference, the court may enter an order controlling the course of the proceedings or implementing any settlement agreement." FED. R. App. P. 33 (1994).
80. FED. R. App. P. 33 (1993).
81. 1904 Panel R. 69(2)(c).
82. 1904 Panel R. 69(3).
83. FED. R. App. P. 34(e).
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I was recently struggling with NAFTA Article 1905, which I
think many of you are going to come to know and have some
emotional reaction to. It is a very complicated provision, and I
was struck [by] how its concepts are extraordinarily Anglo/
American. 84
He could have made exactly the same remarks about Article

1904, as well as about the Panel Rules stemming from that Article. The Article 1904 panel review procedure embodies the conception of procedure characteristic of the common law,
particularly as developed in the United States.
To speak generally about a common law or even a U.S. con-

ception of procedure is, inevitably, to risk simplifying and distorting the existing procedural practice. More than one
conception is at play. In fact, that practice is the product of the
clash of various such conceptions. It nevertheless makes sense to
talk about a U.S. and even a common law conception, or picture,
of procedure. 85 There is a more or less coherent picture that has

a dominant function in shaping procedure and that serves as a
counterpoint to opposing pictures. Because of their common historical legacy, their parallel development in response to similar
subsequent challenges, and their continuous transnational theoretical dialogue, the various common law jurisdictions all tend to
converge onto that same procedural picture.
A particular picture of procedure emerges as a consequence
of an intricate interplay of praxis and theory. 86 When engaging
in procedural (or any legal) practice, individuals grasp and imagine what they are doing through rough pictures or stories. In the
common law tradition, judges and lawyers explain their procedural activity to themselves and to others by invoking a picture
(or a story) in which the parties move the process along and finally present their cases to the decision maker in an all-important
oral proceeding. This picture, which becomes more complex as
84. Discussion of the Differences between the United States and Mexican Legal
Systems, 1 U.S.-MEx.L.J. 113 (1993)(answer by James F. Smith).
85. The term "picture" is perhaps preferrable to "conception" inasmuch as it
underscores the fact that what is referred to is a representation and an approximation. A conception of procedure sounds too much like a worked-out interpretation
of procedure, whereas a picture of procedure appears to be less exact. As I am using
the term and will make clear below, a "picture" may be well-defined but may also be
more tentative and vague. The terms "story" and "narrative" are also possible and
perhaps trendier. Though I will draw on those terms every now and then, I will
principally employ the term "picture."
86. Thus far I have been referring in singular to "a picture of procedure."
Needless to say, this large picture may also be perceived as composed of or including
smaller pictures. In other words, the picture of procedure may be taken to include a
picture of the role of the judge, counsel, and parties, a picture of the pleading phase,
of the trial, of the appeal, and so on. These sub-pictures, though potentially at odds
with each other, may be taken to fit loosely into the larger picture.
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the details are filled in, affects not only the creation and interpretation of procedural precepts but also what to do in the absence
of pre-established procedural guidelines.8 7 In certain procedural
situations, we may invoke the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein and
assert: "A picture [holds] us captive." 8 8 "The picture," Wittgenstein admonishes, "is to be taken seriously."8 9
The picture that comes to life within the common law procedural practice, like any other procedural picture, is tentative,
often not explicit, and unsystematic. 9° To be sure, many aspects
of the practice do not fit the picture. Common law civil procedure, in other words, embodies counterpictures. 9 ' The prevailing
picture coexists with, clashes with, and may eventually succumb
to its counterparts. If a counterpicture ever becomes dominant,
the currently predominant picture will certainly not disappear
completely; it will merely take over the role of opposition.
Before I go into the issue of the extent to which the Article
1904 panel review scheme reflects the common law procedural
picture, a caveat is in order. Associating the notion of a procedural picture with that of representation would be misleading.
There is no strict relationship of separation and correlation between picture and reality. In other words, there is no self-standing procedural reality, which the picture merely mirrors. Picture
and reality are inextricably intertwined. 92 A procedural picture
87. Perhaps this approach to practice is most clearly identifiable in the modem
societies, in which the legal system is expected rationally to justify the way in which
it operates. Legal actors thus become more reflective and pictures facilitate this
process of reflection. Yet, pictures (and especially stories) probably also play a central role in premodern societies, despite the fact that there is less of a need to provide a rational explanation for authoritative decisions. Pictures help legal agents not
only rationalize but also understand and go on with their activities.
88. LUDWIG WITGrENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN § 115
(1967)(emphasis in original).
89. Id. at § 427.
90. Jurists who specialize in theory flesh out the picture. These jurists produce a
clearer picture. In doing so they usually first take a leap away from praxis and then
seek to push that praxis toward their picture. The efforts of these specialists serve at
times to identify the dominant picture and sometimes to reinforce or even establish
that dominance.
91. Again, another group of theorists must act as a midwife. These critical theoreticians bring the counter-features together, more explicitly, into a counter-picture.
92. The work of Wittgenstein might help establish a contrast between the purely
representational and the interactive notion of a picture. In his TRAcrATus LOGiCOLUDWIG
PHILOSOPHICUS, Wittgenstein embraces the representational notion.
W-rrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS §§ 2.1-2.225. "A picture," he

explains, "represents its subject from a position outside it (its standpoint is its representation form). That is why the picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly." Id. at §2.173. Further: "A picture is a model of reality." Id. at § 2.12.
What picture and reality share is a structure or a form, i.e., the way in which their
components are organized. "That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches
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is part of procedural reality. 93 A picture affects procedural actors
and actions in a manner that is similar to that of rules or authoritative interpretations. A picture, like a rule, may bind actors to
proceed (and may require that actions unfold) in a particular way

94
and thus constitutes an essential part of the procedural practice.
The Article 1904 panel review procedure clearly incarnates
what I have been referring to as the common law procedural pic-

right out to it." Id. at § 2.1511. Despite this connection, a picture is severable from
and subservient to reality.
In his PMLOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, however, Wittgenstein seems at times
to have the interactive notion of a picture in mind. A picture, accordingly, is seen as
part of a language game. Wittgenstein treats the concept of a picture as synonymous
with that of a paradigm and distinguishes it from that of an image, i.e, "Vorstellung."
See

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN §

300 (1967). A

picture is a tool in a language game. As such, it may be used to teach beginners how
to play. It may also serve as a reference point to decide controversies that might
arise in the game. It is not merely a depiction of an object or of reality.
I disagree with Saul Kripke who associates the concept of a picture in the INVESTIGATIONS with that in the TRACTATUS. "Wittgenstein's use of the term 'picture'
[in §301 of the PHILOSPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS] is related to his use of it in the
TRAcTATuS-a picture is to be compared with reality, it says that the external world
is in a state corresponding to the picture." SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITrGENSTEN: ON
RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 139 (1982). I do not think that this representational account of a picture accurately captures the concept of picture used in the
cited passage of the INVESTIGATIONS.
93. A color square offers a model to understand the notion of a picture. A red
color square may be used to teach a child what red is. It may also be employed to
settle the question of whether a particular object is red. See LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN § 53 (1967)(discussing a table of colors
that is "used in teaching the language or brought in to decide certain controversial
cases"). Yet, the color square does not represent any kind of object or reality.
There is no independent redness entity, which is depicted by the color square. In the
language game in which the concept of redness is deployed, players create a color
square as an instrument, which is to perform a specific function.
Similarly, a picture of procedure is embedded in a particular language game, in
a procedural reality. It does not simply depict a procedural reality. It also may be
drawn upon to teach students and to settle disputed cases. Of course, a procedural
picture is much more complex than a color square. A procedural picture might be
said to be composed of numerous elements or even sub-pictures, such as the picture
of the pleading phase or a picture of the role of the decison-maker. Still, a picture of
procedure may generally be used to decide whether a particular procedure is legitimate. When the rules and the interpretations do not provide an answer, procedural
actors may refer back-explicitly or implicitly-to the procedural picture.
94. A procedural picture emerges over years of procedural activity. It is deeply
embedded in procedural reality. Therefore, even though it is a creation, it is not a
mere convention that may be easily discarded. Transcending a procedural picture
requires a radical transformation in the way procedure is thought about and structured. Moreover, the internal components of a procedural picture hang together as
coherently as the picture as a whole does with its correponding procedural reality.
A procedural picture, though never fully coherent, must have a certain degree of
coherence if it is to play a significant role within the procedural system. A hopelessly incoherent picture will be incapable of informing procedural actors or actions.
Consequently, particular elements of a procedural picture may not be altered or
eliminated at will. The inner logic of the procedural picture must be preserved.
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ture. It will, like common law civil procedure generally, at times
deviate from that picture and come closer to the counterpictures.
Nonetheless, the procedural picture will inevitably play a decisive role in molding the panel review system.
As a first example, the panel review procedure transplants
the common law practice of preemptory challenges in choosing
the civil jury to the selection of panel members. In the Article
1904 review system, each involved party has "the right to exercise
four peremptory challenges, to be exercised simultaneously and
in confidence, disqualifying from appointment to the panel up to
four candidates proposed by the other involved Party." 95 In U.S.
civil cases, each party "is entitled to three peremptory challenges" 96 in the selection of a jury. "The use of peremptory challenges is of ancient origin and is given to aid each party's interest
in a fair and impartial jury. '97 The Anglo-Canadian practice of
peremptory challenges comes from the same
origin as and has a
98
scope similar to that of the United States.
The panel review system also incorporates the classic common law notion of a separate, self-standing, and long-winded
pleading phase. The common law traditionally viewed that stage
as necessary in order thoroughly to prepare the ground for the
classic one-shot trial. In common law jurisdictions, Merryman
explains, "precise formulation of the issues in pleading and pretrial proceedings is seen as necessary preparation for the concentrated event of the trial." 99 By replicating this phase the panel
review process almost over-prepares the case for the oral argument. It provides for requests of review, complaints, notices of
appearance, and numerous motions. 1°° Of course, in addition to
these pleadings, the Rules call for various briefs by the
participants. 101
The manner in which the panel announces its decision at the
end also evokes the common law method. Panel decisions have
95. NAFTA, annex 1901.2 2.
96. 28 U.S.C. §1870.
97. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2483 (1995).
98. "Both England and Canada have, for many years, used peremptory challenges in jury selection systems similar to our own." Judith Heinz, Comment, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of Regulation in the United
States, England, and Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 201, 203 (1993).

"Canada, like the United States, still permits the peremptory challenge". Nancy S.
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1014, 1103 (1995) (citing Judith Heinz, Comment, Peremptory Challenges in
Criminal Cases: A Comparison of Regulation in the United States, England, and

Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMip. L.J. 201, 227 (1993)).
99. JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
100. See 1904 Panel R. 34, 39, 40, & 61.
101. See 1904 Panel R. 58-60.

TRADITION

113 (1985).
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to be "by majority vote and based on the votes of all members of
the panel.' 02 The panel must issue a written opinion supporting
its reasoning and decision. 103 The panelists who do not join the
majority's decision are supposed to put their concurring or dissenting opinion in writing. 10 4
Common law systems notoriously ate centered around the
elaborate opinions of judges, particularly at the appellate
level. 0 5 Those opinions are paramount sources of law. They are
the vehicles through which the common law emerges and
evolves. As such, the opinions of the judges must be available in
print, and in addition must lay out the judges' reasons so that
jurists may generalize the content and apply it to other cases. 1°6
The broad impact of common law court decisions has contributed significantly to the tendency of judges to concur or dissent in writing. First, when more is at stake than the fate of the
individuals before the court, judges feel more inclined to distance
themselves from opinions with which they disagree. Second, the
wider applicability of court decisions requires more explicit majority opinions, which in turn invites dissenting and concurring
opinions.
Common law judges do not merely issue decisions but also
articulate reasons. 107 A separate concurring opinion makes sense
only in situations where reasons are attached to the decision. In
addition, a dissenting statement has more of a point when contrasted with a majority opinion, and not with a decision that simply announces an outcome. In the former scenario, the dissenter
is elaborating her own reasons against those of the majority. In
the latter, the dissenter only has the majority's preferred result
with which to contend.
In addition, the panel review system borrows from common
law appellate procedure the corresponding restricted scope of re102. NAFrA, annex 1901.2 5.
103. NAFTA, annex 1901.2 5. See also 1904 Panel R. 74.("A panel shall issue a
written decision with reasons, together with any dissenting or concurring opinions of
the panelists, in accordance with Article 1904.8 of the Agreement.").
104. NAFTA, annex 1901.2 5 & 1904 Panel R. 74. On this point, the procedures for settling disputes on the Agreement's interpretation diverge from the Article 1904 and the common law approach. Article 2017 declares: "No panel may,
either in its initial report or its final report, disclose which panelists are associated
with majority or minority opinions." NAFTA art. 2017. See also LESLIE ALAN
GLICK, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 11 (2d
ed. 1994).
105. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL
AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS 239 (1983).
106. "Not content simply to decide the case before them and enter the appropriate judgment, appellate courts have put in written form their reasons for deciding a
case one way rather than another." Id.

107. Id.
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view. First, the review is based on the administrative record

08

and no provision is made for consideration of any additional evidence. Second, the panel must either "uphold a final determina-

tion, or remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel's

decision."' 0 9 The panel's decision does not substitute but rather

identifies the errors of the investigating authority's decision. Finally, though Article 1904 requires the panel to apply the domestic standard of review," 0 all three standards defer to the
investigating authority's factual determinations. The degree of
deference will depend on the particular standard of review
invoked."'
The Article 1904 panel review procedure's approach to attorney's fees, however, is consistent not with common law procedure generally, but rather with U.S. civil procedure specifically.
"In the United States," John Merryman points out, "if A sues
someone, he usually must pay his own lawyer, whether he wins
or loses. 11 2 Similarly, Panel Rule 32 provides that "[eJach participant shall bear the costs of, and those incidental to, its own

participation in a panel review.""13 The panel review procedure
thus adopts the so-called "American rule" 114 not just with respect
to attorney's fees, but with respect to all costs. In United States
federal practice, costs other than attorney's fees tend to be saddled on the losing party. 115 Other common law courts, including

108. 1904 Panel R. 41 requires that the investigating authority file the administrative record. NAFTA mandates expressly that the review for Mexican determinations be "based solely on the administrative record." NAFTA, annex 1911
("standard of review").
109. NAFTA, art. 1904 8.
110. NAFTA, art. 1904 3 & annex 1911.
111. Article 238 of the Mexican Federal Tax Code simply establishes that the
Federal Tax Court must set aside the determination if it finds "incorrect or misunderstood facts." CODIGO FISCAL DE LA FEDERACION [C.F.F.] art. 238 (Mex.) Not
just any determination may be overturned under these circumstances, however.
Only an "unfair determination". Id. So the Federal Tax Court must in fact defer to
incorrect findings of fact of the investigating authority, unless the determination is
unfair.
Subsection 18.1(4) of Canada's Federal Court Act, in turn, authorizes reversing
determinations if the investigating authority "based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without
regard for the material before it". S.C. 1990, c.8, s.5.
112. MERRYMAN, supra note 99, at 119.
113. 1904 Panel R. 32.
114. See Key Tronic Corporation v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 1962 (1994)
("Under the longstanding 'American rule', attorney's fees generally are not a recoverable cost of litigation absent explicit congressional authorization") (citing Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
115. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d)(1); FED. R. App. P. 39(a).
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those of Canada, 116 tend to impose costs, including attorney's
fees, on the losing party.
The Article 1904 procedure's treatment of the selection of
panelists, the pleading phase, the panel's decision, the scope of
review, and attorney's fees is thus faithful to the common law
procedural picture, especially as it has evolved in the United
States. The panel review procedure actualizes the common law
procedural picture in other, more fundamental, respects. That
procedure, for one, endorses the common law understanding of
the nature and role of procedural rules. The common law tradition regards each rule as a self-standing precept, which courts
must apply in each procedural situation independently of the rest
of the rules. The rules do not constitute an integrated system.
Nor does the meaning of each rule depend on the entire body of
rules or on the place that the rule occupies within that totality.
The common law vision of procedural rules typically
manifests itself in the fact that the main procedural guidelines
appear in a set of rules, as opposed to a code. "In Canada, as in
England, most countries of the commonwealth and the United
States, the principles of civil procedure are embodied largely in
written Rules of Court. 1 17 Similarly, the Article 1904 panel review procedure presents its written parameters "as the NAFTA
Article 1904 Panel Rules."'1 18 Furthermore, the Rules' "Statement of General Intent" reflects the corresponding common law
rules ideology when it makes the following declaration:
Where a procedural question arises that is not covered by
these rules, a panel may adopt the procedure to be followed in
the particular case before it by analogy to these rules or may
refer for guidance to rules of procedure of a court that would
otherwise have had jurisdiction in the importing country. 119

The implicit idea is that the Rules are discrete precepts that
cover only a specific set of procedural questions. If a question
emerges that none of the Rules addresses expressly, the panel
shifts to a discretionary interpretative mode. The panel may, but
does not have to, rely on analogous rules. Those analogous rules

do not constitute an essential part of a system whose structure is
delineated by the posited rules. Instead they represent a sepa116. "In most jurisdictions in Canada costs are said to be in the discretion of the
Court.... However, in fact this power is overwhelmingly interpreted as indicating
that 'costs follow the event'-that is, losers pay costs to winners." GARRY D. WATSON ET AL.,

CANADIAN

CIVIL PROCEDURE:

CASES AND

MATERIAL

266 (3d ed.

1988).
117. Id. at 2. But cf CODE DE PROCVEDURE CIVILE DU QU8BEC (1980).

118. 1904 Panel R. 1.
119. 1904 Panel R. 2.

1997]

PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

235

rate aggregation of discrete procedural precepts, much like the
rules of the replaced domestic courts.
Inasmuch as it is centered around a single hearing in which
the issues are discussed and decided, 20 the Article 1904 panel
review procedure assimilates another basic component of the
common law procedural picture. The concentration of the legal
procedure into one event is paradigmatic of the common law tradition. In most common law cases, lawyers bring forth all the
evidence and arguments at once before the jury. Because congregating the jury gives rise to considerable difficulty, it does not
make much sense to have various jury sessions spread out
throughout the duration of the litigation. 121 The "pre-trial"
stage narrows down the issues in order to enable the jury to consider them at one time.
Common law jurisdictions preserve this compressed structure even in cases in which there is no jury. In fact, even common law appellate procedure evinces a bent for concentration.
During the common law appeal, the procedural activity is similarly built around a single oral argument. In this proceeding, the
parties
present reasons for reversing or affirming the decision below.' 2 2 The petition for review, the briefs, and particularly the
prehearing conference simplify the issues so that the court may
dispose of them during oral argument.
This consolidation of the main litigious activity into a single
event leads to an increase in formality and even drama. A precise format is necessary in order to make sure the lawyers are
able to make their case during the proceeding. The format is, of
course, much more complex at the trial than at the appellate
level. But both the trial and the appellate hearing have a general
structure that requires the airing of first one and then the other
side of the controversy and provides an opportunity for rebuttal
at the end. Further, both proceedings have a similar mystique
within their procedural context. They are different in character
than, provide a center of gravity for, and transcend in importance all other procedural activity. The legal actors-especially
120. See 1904 Panel R. 67; NAFTA art. 1904 14.
121. See Arthur Von Mehren, The Significance for ProceduralPracticeand Theory of the Concentrated Triak Comparative Remarks, 2 EUROPAISCHEs REcHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE uND GEGENWART:

FESTSCHR1Fr FOR HELMUT COING

361, 364 (N. Horn ed. 1982); John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 863-64 (1985); JoHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW

TRADITION 112 (1985). Von Mehren argues that trials had to be concentrated also
because, "at least until relatively modem times, there was probably no way in which
material presented at widely separate points in time could have been preserved in a
form that would have enabled the jury to refresh its recollection when it ultimately
came to deliberate and render the verdict." Mehren, supra, at 364-65.
122. FED. R. App. P. 34.

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:205

the attorneys-are under considerable pressure to offer their
best performance during this crucial event. 123
The Article 1904 review procedure embraces the common
law approach inasmuch as it compresses the deliberative activity
into a single oral argument. 124 The oral argument will accordingly tend to take place with rigidity and intensity. The standard
format calls to mind a U.S. appeal: First the complainant's side
argues, then the respondent's side, and finally there may be (at
the panel's discretion) an argument in reply. 125 Panelists may ask
questions at any stage; 12 6 yet, their intervention, like that of common law appellate judges, should not upset the pre-established
standard format of the oral argument. Moreover, the centrality
of the panel review's oral argument will create a high-strung atmosphere, just as the common law trial or appellate hearing.
The Panel Rules, to be sure, provide for two other kinds of
face-to-face encounters between the panelists and the attorneys. 127 However, these meetings are demarcated from and
subordinated to the central oral hearing. They pave the way for
that final hearing, much like the pleadings and the briefs. First,
the panel may hear oral argument before ruling on a motion by
one of the participants. 1 28 This gathering is supposed to facilitate
deciding the preliminary or side questions raised in the motion
before going into the main issue during the oral hearing. The
panel may, secondly, hold a pre-hearing conference. 129 This assembly principally purports to clarify the issues or the procedure
before the oral hearing. 130 The pre-hearing conference as well as
the motion hearings unequivocally underscore the fact that the
oral argument is the heart of the antidumping and countervailing
duty review procedure.
The idea of assigning a passive role to the panel and allocating ultimate procedural control to the participants also comports
with the common law model. In common law jurisdictions, the
traditional view is that the controversy involves and interests
only the parties to the action. The parties are accordingly taken
to be in the best position, both cognitively and motivationally, to
probe into the matter. The parties and their attorneys produce
and introduce the evidence and the arguments and generally
123.
124.
125.
126.
do not
127.
128.
129.
130.

See JoHN MERRYMAN, TmE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 113 (1985).
See 1904 Panel R. 67.
Cf 1904 Panel R. 67(2) with RAP FED. R. App. P. 34(c).
The rules do not expressly authorize the panelists to pose questions but they
exclude that possibility either.
See 1904 Panel R. 65(2) & 68.
1904 Panel R. 65(2).
1904 Panel R. 68.
1904 Panel R. 68(3).
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move the process along. The decision maker (the court or the
jury) is reactive; it lets the cause unfold and then chooses
among
3
the competing versions of the facts and of the law.' '
The Article 1904 procedure is premised on this model. The
participants both start and guide the process. They not only file
the pleadings and briefs but also, through motions, direct the
course of the litigation.' 32 Panel Rule 63 authorizes them to file
motions generally, 133 while Rule 68 entitles them to move for a
pre-hearing conference to clarify the issues and the oral argument's procedure.

34

A Rule 68 motion consists in "a written re-

quest setting out the matters that the participant proposes to
raise at the conference.' 1 35 More importantly, the participants
bring up and discuss the issues during the oral argument. Though
the panel, as already noted, may pose any kind and number of
questions, the expectation is that panelists, like common law appellate judges, will simply demand explications or probe into the
reasoning of the participants. The panelists' function is merely to
facilitate the participants' discussion, not to start a separate
debate.
Nothing precludes the panel from filing its own motions regarding any of the procedural issues. In fact, the Panel Rules at
times explicitly empower the panel as well as the participants to
make motions, such as "to issue an order to show cause why the
panel review should not be dismissed" when the complainant
fails to submit a brief. 136 Theoretically, a runaway panel could
(like a judicially active U.S. Court) orchestrate the procedure
proactively, through motions and orders. Such a panel could also
completely dominate the oral argument and even radically
change the format. 137 Yet, this kind of activism, inasmuch as it
would run against the grain of the panel review system, will be
extremely unusual. Further, panelists, whom the system assigns
131. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976) (In "the traditional conception of adjudication...
the trial judge... was [generally] passive. He was to decide only those issues identified by the parties.").
132. See generally 1904 Panel R. 39, 40, 57, & 63.
133. 1904 Panel R. 63.
134. 1904 Panel R. 68.
135. 1904 Panel R. 68. The establishment of a joint panel review in the context
of rule 36 offers another example of the panel's passivity vis Avis the participants. A
joint panel to review two different final determinations involving the same goods
may be held only if one of the participants so moves. Yet, if any of the participants
objects "the motion shall be deemed to be denied and separate panel reviews shall
be held." The panel's views on the desirability of a joint review under rule 36 are
irrelevant.
136. 1904 Panel R. 61(2)(b).
137. The Panel Rules establish a format to be followed by the oral argument
"unless the panel otherwise orders." 1904 Panel R. 69(2).
HARV.
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to a particular case on an ad hoc basis, will normally lack the
time and motivation to stage a coup and take over the process.
In general, the participants will define the procedural issues and
set the agenda in the Article 1904 review system.
It is crucial to keep in mind that United States civil procedure has recently begun evolving away from the classical approach to procedural structure and propulsion. First, procedure
is organized less and less around an all-important, rigid oral
event. While at the trial level cases are increasingly decided at
the pretrial level through a series of relatively informal hearings,
the importance of the appellate oral argument has shifted to
other hearings, such as the motion hearings and prehearing conference, and especially to the briefs. 138 The structure of procedure has thus become less concentrated and formal, and more
dispersed and flexible. Second, the decision maker now often assumes responsibility for advancing and shaping the litigation. 139
The United States legal system has witnessed the emergence of
what Judith Resnik terms "the managerial judge":
Many federal judges have departed from their earlier attitudes; they have dropped the relatively disinterested pose to
adopt a more active, "managerial" stance. In growing numbers, judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues
presented to them by litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and to
supervise case preparation. Both before and after the trial,
138. "Oral argument has held center stage for most of the history of appellate
review, in part for historical reasons. Appellate review developed in England primarily as an oral process because of the preferences of those involved and the cost
and difficulty of printing.... Oral argument is no longer the central focus of the
appellate process but rather just one step in the process through which the appellate
court performs its function of error correction or law development. This is not to
say that oral argument is no longer important.... Today judges take advantage of
oral argument to explore with the attorneys particular difficult legal or factual points
in the case; failure to satisfy the judges on that point may result in an adverse deci-

sion."

ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND
STATE CIVIL APPEALS 211 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Most commentators agree
that oral argument continues to be crucial. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FEDERAL

APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE

263 (1987) ("Oral argument is always im-

portant and never to be waived."). Some obervers attribute far more importance to
oral argument than Martineau does. Justice William Brennan, for instance, contends
that "oral argument is the absolutely indispensable ingredient of appellate advocacy ....
[O]ften my whole notion of what a case is about crystallizes at oral argument." Justice William Brennan, PROCEEDINGS IN HONOR OF MR. JUST. BRENNAN,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, "OCCASIONAL PAMPHLET

No. 9", 22-23.

139. Chayes, supra note 131, at 1282 ("The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and statement of governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation
to ensure a just and viable outcome."). See also Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court,
1981 Term: Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 5 (1982).
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judges are playing
a critical role in shaping litigation and influ14 0
encing results.

The "managerial judge" described by Resnik departs radically
from the prototypically disengaged and dispassionate decision

maker.
The movement toward the managerial judge, like that toward a diffuse and relaxed examination of the case, has been ir-

regular. The extent to which this trend has taken place, even
within the U.S. federal system, varies from one chamber (and
from one case) to the next. There has been, further, a counter-

current. 141 Jurists have often criticized the informal procedural
interaction as well as the expanded involvement of the judiciary. 142 Finally, even cases decided at pre-trial stage or during the

prehearing conference by managerial judges do not escape completely the traditional procedural picture. Despite its absence,

the trial or the oral argument structures the rest of the procedural ado; the prospect or threat of a trial motivates most proce-

dural actions in the litigation. Managerial judges, in turn, only
encourage the parties to move the process along; they do not
completely take over the responsibility for directing the proce-

dural course. It is fair to say that, at least in comparison to civil
law jurisdictions, the United States legal system continues to be
notably influenced by a procedural picture characterized by trial143
like process and an inactive decision maker.
In sum, the common law legal tradition has thoroughly influenced the Article 1904 panel review process. In the selection of
the panelists, the pleadings, the announcement of the written de-

cision at the end, the scope of review, and the distribution of
costs, the panel review system clearly bears the imprint of that
140. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77
(1982)(footnotes omitted).
141. Abram Chayes uses the term "countertendencies". Abram Chayes, The
Supreme Court, 1981 Term: Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court,
96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1982).
142. Abram Chayes concedes that "the Burger Court may be seen to be embarked on some such program for the restoration of the traditional forms of adjudication." Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281,1304 (1976). See also Chayes, supra note 141, at 7. ("[T]he general
tone of scholarly, journalistic, and political commentary has been increasingly skeptical of judicial efforts to ride herd on state and federal bureaucracies. Congress has
contemplated restrictions on federal court jurisdiction, and the Attorney General
has set about by word and deed to bring the judges to heel.") (footnotes omitted);
Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979) ("By the mid- and
late-1970's, however, a new position had formed on the Supreme Court; a strong
bloc of Justices, sometimes obtaining support from the center of the Court, sought to
reverse the [structural reform] processes that were still afoot in the lower courts.").
143. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 131, at 1298. ("We may not yet have reached
the investigative judge of the continental systems, but we have left the passive arbiter of the traditional model a long way behind.").
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tradition, at least as it lives in the United States. But the Article
1904 procedure tracks the common law procedural picture in a
deeper sense. It proves to be a. quintessential common law procedure inasmuch as it is based on a set of discrete and self-standing rules, organizes all procedural activity around a single
hearing, and assigns the task of guiding the process to the
participants.
Of course, there are counterpictures at work in the common
law tradition as well, such as that associated with an informal and
spread out pre-trial proceeding and with the managerial judge. It
is possible that the Article 1904 panel review process, like civil
procedure in the United States, will occasionally develop toward
the counterpictures. Yet the main picture will continue to play a
key role: determining how legal actors think of and structure procedure. The next section shows that the dominant picture of civil
procedure in Mexico is quite different.
V. A DIFFERENT CONCEPTION OF PROCEDURE
A U.S. lawyer would clearly feel right at home in any of
these panel review proceedings. An Anglo-Canadian lawyer
would find them familiar, insofar as they reproduce concepts not
just of U.S. law but of the common law tradition more generally. 144 A Mexican jurist, in contrast, would find the procedure
completely foreign. In this sense, the Mexican jurist would be
reacting in part very much like any other lawyer trained in the
civil law tradition. 145 This section focuses on how the Mexican
procedural picture is, in many ways, close to that of other civil
law jurisdictions146and fundamentally at odds with the common
law conception.
The Mexican procedural picture departs from the common
law picture on all of the points discussed in the previous section.

144. Of course, Quebecois lawyers would probably feel less connected to this
common law procedure than their Anglo-Canadian colleagues. As explained supra,
Quebec's civil procedure has, to a great extent, remained true to its civil law roots.
145. Vfctor Carlos Garcia Moreno & C6sar E. Hemrndez Ochoa, Neoprotectionism and Dispute Resolution Panels as Defense Mechanisms Against Unfair Trade
Practices: A Focus on Mexico, MAKING FREE TRADE WORK IN THE AMERICAs 692,
712 (Boris Kozolchyk ed. 1993) ("Mexico follows a legal tradition that differs greatly
from that of Canada and the United States. FTA terms, such as 'panels,' and various
legal standards are seldom used in Mexican law.").
146. The Mexican legal system belongs to the civil law universe. Civil law jurisdictions have evolved toward a common'procedural picture because they share historical roots, they have faced similar subsequent challenges, and there is a significant
degree of cross-fertilization in the debate on civil procedure.
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First, since it does not provide for a jury, 147 Mexican law (like the
civil law tradition generally) never had the possibility of developing a practice such as the peremptory challenge. Second, in civil
law systems, "pleading is very general, and the issues are defined
as the proceeding goes on. '1 48 This description of the pleading
phase clearly applies to Mexican civil procedure. a49 The pleadings do not have to delimit the disputed matters too sharply in
anticipation of a trial. The court may narrow down the issues as
the process unfolds.
Third, decisions issued by Mexican judges, both at the trial
and the appellate level, are not as elaborate as their common law
homologues. The Mexican Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures 150 contains only a short account of the requirements for
the judgment: "The judgment shall be clear, precise, and consistent with the complaint and the answer, as well as with the claims
that have been raised in a timely manner during the suit. It shall,
moreover, condemn or absolve the defendant and decide all the
debate's litigated issues."'1 5 1 The Federal Code of Civil Procedures describes more fully the statement that must accompany a
judgment at both the trial and appellate level as follows:
In addition to meeting the requirements for any judicial resolution, the judgment shall contain a succinct account of the issues raised and of the evidence introduced, as well as of the
applicable judicial considerations, both legal and doctrinal.
Along with the judicial considerations, the judgment shall include the motive for imposing or not imposing costs and shall
147. In Mexico "juries are not used and 'trials' as we understand them are not
held in civil cases." JAMES E. HERGET & JORGE CAMIL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

96-97 (1978).

148. MERRYMAN, supra note 99, at 113. Merryman links this approach to pleading with the lack of concentration in the civil law tradition. Id.
149. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 147, at 74.
150. Whereas the Federal Code of Civil Procedures applies to suits brought in
the Mexican Federal Courts, the Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures covers
cases litigated in the local courts of the Federal District. The Federal District, like
any Mexican state, has its own judiciary, separate from the federal system of
tribunals.
151. CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES PARA EL DisTR1ro FEDERAL
[C.P.C.D.F.] art. 81 (Mex.). "The judgement (sentencia) follows a standard format,
usually one or two pages in length, in which there are vague findings of fact and law
[T]he judgement of the appellate
and an order granting the appropriate relief ....
court also follows a standard format and is usually more extensive than the trial
court's judgement. In most cases it will contain the names of the parties and date of
the decision followed by a 'whereas' which is then followed by a summary statement
of the facts of the case point by point. This is followed by the word 'considering',
then the various applicable legal (statutory) authorities are cited and discussed. Finally, 'It is therefore decided' is followed by the ruling of the court. Although this
format of court opinion would appear to distinguish carefully between questions of
fact and questions of law, the actual discussion found in the cases usually does not
do so." HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 147, at 76.
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conclude by solving precisely the matters submitted to the
152
court's consideration and setting a deadline for compliance.
Mexican judges thus simply attach a brief account of issues and
evidence, a list of legal considerations, and an order with a deadline. The opinion included in the judgment is usually extremely
brief, even on appeal. "At the appellate level, except for the
Supreme Court itself, judges do not write extensive opinions as
U.S. appellate judges do. A simple one page judgement normally suffices because the system of judicial precedent is not followed."'1 53 "In some cases the opinion is given in a very brief one
or two paragraphs.' 1 54 "These appellate judicial opinions are of
course kept as a record of the court, but they are not ordinarily
55
published."1
The brevity of the opinions betrays the civil law antecedents
of Mexican courts. In the civil law tradition judges write extremely compact majority opinions and rarely enter concurrences
or dissents.
In general, there are no separate concurring or dissenting
opinions, even at the appellate level, in civil law jurisdictions.
Although exceptions do exist, the general rule is one of unanimity and anonymity. Even dissenting votes are not noted,
and it is considered unethical for a judge to indicate that he
has taken a position 156
at variance with that announced in the
decision of the court.

This general statement could be applied to the Mexican legal system. However, as John Merryman acknowledges, there is a trend
in the civil law tradition toward writing dissents and concur157
rences in constitutional cases.
Fourth, Mexican appellate tribunals have a relatively broad
scope of inquiry. Even though the civil appeal does not involve a
completely new decision of the entire case, 158 there is no pre152.

C6DIGo FEDERAL DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES [C.F.P.C.] art. 222 (Mex.).

153. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 147, at 97. Reflecting the wide divergence
between the Mexican and the U.S. conception of the opinion, Carlos Arellano Garcfa writes that "in the United States, where judicial precedents are so important,
opinions constitute true juridical studies of great substance. In our system there
should be an opinion of note when the isues are of great significance or judicial
interest." CARLOS ARELLANO GARCIA, Derecho Procesal Civil 473 (1981).
154. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 147, at 77.
155. Id.
156. MERRYmAN, supra note 99, at 121.

157. Id.
158. Jos6 Becerra Bautista contends that the Mexican appellate system, which is
derived from the Spanish, consists in revisio prioris instantiae, as opposed to a
novum judicium. Jost BECERRA BAUTISTA, EL PROCESO CML

EN MExico 590
(1986). The appellate suit, he insists, "is not one in which the same problems considered by the trial court are brought up again to the full knowledge of the court of
appeals. It is, instead, a review of the resolution dictated by the trial court so as to
correct the errors in judicando or in procedando, alleged by the petitioning party in
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sumption of correctness attached to that judgment. James. E.
court
Herget and Jorge Camil maintain that the appellate
"makes its own decision on both factual and legal issues."'1 59 Jos6
Becerra Bautista notes that in exceptional cases, evidence not
considered by the trial court may be admitted on appeal.1 60 The
Code of Civil Procedures for the Federal District allows the introduction of evidence "when an event has occurred that imports
a subsequent exception.' 161 The Federal Code of Civil Procedure is more liberal on this point and authorizes the parties to
bring in new evidence on appeal:
so long as such evidence was not presented at the trial level for
reasons beyond the control of the parties or relates to exceptions emerging subsequent to the hearing of allegations by the
which the interested
trial court or to antecedent exceptions, of 162
party was unaware prior to that hearing.
Further, the appellate tribunal lacks the authority to remand the
case to the trial court. In contrast to the common law, both the
Federal Code of Civil Procedures and the Code of Civil Procedures for the Federal District allow the appellate court to affirm,
reverse, or modify the judgment from below, but not to remand
it.163

The approach to attorney's fees constitutes a fifth point of
divergence between the Mexican and the U.S. procedural pictures. "In civil law countries... the loser usually pays the winner's counsel fees." 64 The civil law tradition does not distinguish
between attorney's fees and court costs. It shifts attorney's fees
to the losing party, as part of the costs. It regards counsel less as
an extension of the parties and more as part of the process. Similarly, in the Mexican legal system the losing party normally must
pay the prevailing party's litigation costs, including attorney's
fees. "The Federal Code of Civil Procedures follows the criterion
of those regimes that impose the payment of costs as a consethe statement of grievances." Id. at 591. See also SEBASTIAN ESTRELLA MNDEZ,
ESTUDIO DE LO MEDIOS DE IMPUGNACION EN EL CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS

CIVILES PARA EL DISTIUTO FEDERAL 73-74 (1987).
159. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 147, at 76. The review is limited to the ques-

tions raised by the petitioner, though: "The activity of the appellate judge falls
upon the matter which was the object of the process, not exclusively upon the sentence of the trial court. This activity nonetheless has the limitation imposed by the
appellant's claim. The tribunal is not permitted to add grievances that have not
been formulated at all nor to supplement those that have been formulated defi-

ciently."

RAFAEL DE PINA & Jost CASTILLO LARRAINAGA, DERECHO PROCESAL

CIVIL 358 (1990).

160. Jose BECERRA BAUTISTA, EL PROCESO CIVIL EN Mtxico 591 (1986).
161. C.P.C.D.F. art. 706 (Mex.).
162. C.F.P.C. art. 253 (Mex.).
163. See C.F.P.C. art. 231 (Mex.) & C.P.C.D.F. art. 688 (Mex.).
164. MERRYMAN, supra note 99, at 119.
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quence of defeat (Art. 7). ' ' 165 Article 7 of that Code reads: "The

losing party shall reimburse its opponent for the process's

cost. ' 166 The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures, however, takes a less clear cut approach. It generally imposes costs
when required by law and when the losing party has proceeded
with temerity or bad faith. 167 It also shifts costs in certain specific
circumstances, including cases in which the losing party offers no
evidence or false evidence on behalf of his claim, raises a claim
clearly without merit, or delays the proceedings unnecessarily. 168

At any rate, it is understood in Mexico that the costs include attorney's fees. 169
The Mexican procedural picture also distances itself from
the common law picture on the more fundamental issues alluded

to in the previous section. First, the procedural precepts are not
enumerated as rules of court but rather worked into a code. 170
"Procedure in Mexican courts is governed by codes of civil procedure for each of the state, the local courts of the federal district, and the federal district courts.' 171 In this respect, Mexico's
approach to civil procedure is concordant with that of other civil
law jurisdictions. The underlying ideology is that the expressed

165. RAFAEL DE PINA & Jost CASTILLO LARRAIRAGA, DERECHO PROCESAL
CIVIL 342 (1990).
166. C.F.P.C. art. 7 (Mex.). "The losing party will not have to pay costs if it is not
responsible for the failure to achieve a voluntary settlement of the dispute and if it
limited itself to what was strictly necessary in the course of the process for a definite
resolution of the case. The party shall be deemed not be responsible for the failure
to achieve a voluntary settlement of the dispute: (I) when the law requires a judicial
decision, (II) when the dispute involves exclusively an undecided legal issue or calls
for the substitution of the parties' agreement by a judicial order, and (II) when the
party is the defendant and has been sued unnecessarily." Id. at art. 8.
167. C.P.C.D.F. art. 140 (Mex.). See generally CARLos ARELLANO GARCIA, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 502

(1981).

168. C.P.C.D.F. art. 140 (Mex.).
169. See RAFAEL DE PINA & Jost CASTILLO LARRARAGA, DERECHO PROCESAL
CIVIL 342 (1990) ("The concept of costs comprises.., attorney's fees".); Josre
BECERRA BAUTISTA, EL PROCESO CIVIL EN MIXICO 204 (1986) (The award of costs

"covers... the fees of the attorney representing the opposing party."); Eduardo
Pallares, Derecho procesal civil 180 (1978) (The costs "encompass the fees of the
attorneys representing the parties".).
170. See, e.g., C.P.C.D.F. (Mex.) & C.F.P.C. (Mex.). "The cultural center of the
nation is the federal district (Mexico City), and it has no serious rivals. Accordingly,
the code enacted for the federal district and territories has been copied in most
essentials by all of the states. In addition, where federal questions are raised in
litigation, resort to the code for the federal district is authorized." HERGET &
CAMIL, supra note 147, at 35-6.
171. Id. at 74. See, e.g., C.P.C.D.F. (Mex.) & C.F.P.C. (Mex.). "The cultural
center of the nation is the federal distirct (Mexico City), and it has no serious rivals.
Accordingly, the code enacted for the federal district and territories has been copied
in most essentials by all of the states. In addition, where federal questions are raised
in litigation, resort to the code for the federal district is authorized." HERGET &
CAMIL, supra note 147, at 35-6.
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precepts delineate the structure of a coherent procedural system. 172 The code's framers strive to make the different articles
mesh as smoothly as possible.
Present day codes are probably as logically self-consistent as
any body of law will ever be. The use of definitions, uniform
terminology, and general principles all work to assure a high
degree of consistency, something that Anglo-american case
173
law (and sometimes statutory law) rarely, if ever achieves.
More than just avoiding clashes with each other, the code's
articles complement each other. "Different parts of the code...
are interrelated.' 1 74 The various parts, therefore, form a tightly
knit scheme. In interpreting particular provisions of the code,
courts refer to other provisions and to the inner logic of the code
as a whole.
Civil procedure under Mexican law, moreover, is not built
around a single, formal oral hearing. Authors James E. Herget
and Jorge Camil explain that the introduction of evidence:
does not occur at one hearing at which all parties and witnesses are present. There is no trial as such. Rather, evidence
always reis introduced at a series of hearings and is almost
175
duced to writing by a secretary of the court.
Herget and Camil contend that spreading out the trial over a series of proceedings diminishes the element of surprise:
If surprising testimony does turn up, the surprised party can
always explore the new matter further or produce counter-testimony at the next hearing, since there is no significant limit
of evidence which either
on the number of hearings or amount
176
party can offer in good faith."'
In a number of rather informal sessions, settlement is encouraged, 177 statements by the parties themselves are heard, 178
evidence is received, 79 and arguments of the lawyers are considered. 80 Civil process in Mexico is more episodic and less structured than in common law jurisdictions.
The Mexican legal system does not clearly separate oral proceedings on appeal from those at the trial level. Appellate courts
do not have a separate code of procedures; they rely on the same
172. "To a Mexican the term code [accordingly] constitutes the basic structure of
the legal system. It is the source not only of most private law, but of the way in
which the law is conceptualized and interpreted." Id. at 33.
173. Id. at 35.
174. Id. at 33.
175. Id. at 74.
176. Id.at 75-76.
177. C.P.C.D.F. art. 272A (Mex.).
178. Id. at art. 389. See also C.F.P.C. arts. 105-15 (Mex.).
179. C.P.C.D.F. arts. 390-92 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.c. art. 79-80 (Mex.).
180. C.P.C.D.F. art. 393 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.C. art. 256 (Mex.).
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code as trial courts, which includes some special provisions on
appeals.'8 1 Upon examining the evidence (if any), the court
hears the appellate allegations, proceeding "in the manner prescribed for the trial's final hearing. ' 182 Before these sessions on
evidence and allegations, there is a proceeding on whether to
stay the trial judgment's execution, 183 with a presumption in
favor of staying. 184 The tribunal may also stage a hearing on the
timeliness and appropriateness of the appeal. 185 The process is
accordingly as diffuse and open-ended on appeal as at trial.
Mexican law, hence, makes no attempt to purify the procedure or to concentrate the main procedural activity into a single
proceeding. It provides no mechanisms to solve "preliminaries"
or to produce a narrowed-down set of issues, which the court
may devour in one sitting. This statement applies to both the
trial and the appellate stages. Tribunals deal with a multiplicity
of matters through a series of oral and written proceedings,
which are neither ranked nor systematized. The transition from
one session to the next, like the passage from the trial to the
appellate level, involves not a quantum leap but rather an incremental progression.
In the debate surrounding the North American Free Trade
Agreement, both participants and observers often perceived the
difference in the Mexican approach to civil process (as well as
other differences in Mexico's legal and economic institutions) as
a badge of backwardness. The following comments on the
NAFTA panel procedures by Carlos Angulo Parra, a Mexican
lawyer, appear to reflect this perception:
With respect to the procedure itself, I believe that an innovative part of the procedure, at least for Mexico, would be the
possibility of having one general hearing in the panel procedure. The Mexican system of litigation generally requires a
series of separate, written formal submissions to the court.
The hearing, where all of the issues of a matter are put into a
single time frame and all of the parties are put in a single room
to address those issues, provides the panel with a concise and
general presentation of the facts and legal issues in the dispute
so that a final resolution can be issued. This is an innovation
from the Mexican point of view. I believe that this is an op181. See C.P.C.D.F. arts. 688-722 (Mex.); C.F.P.C. arts. 231-266 (Mex.).
182. c.F.P.C. art. 256 (Mex.). The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures
similarly suggests that the allegations hearing follows basically the same principles at
the trial and the appellate level. It discusses the hearing generically and then states
that "no one shall speak for more than 15 minutes at trial and 30 minutes on appeal." C.P.C.D.F. art. 393 (Mex.).
183. C.F.P.C. art. 250 (Mex.).

184. The appellate court must stay the applealed judgment's execution, unless
the law expressly provides otherwise. C.F.P.C. art. 239 (Mex.).
185. See generally C.F.P.C. art. 246-49 (Mex.).

1997]

PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

247

system to importunity for generating an evolution within our186
prove Mexican procedures for solving disputes.
Parra puts his finger on the key conceptual divergence between
Mexican and common law civil procedure. Mexican procedure,
unlike common law procedure, does not aim at formally concentrating all litigious activity into a single point in space and time.
However, the difference by no means constitutes evidence of un187
derdevelopment in Mexico or of a need for improvement.
Rather it stems from Mexico's peculiar legal background.
In its propensity to dispersion and informality, Mexican
procedure is solidly anchored in the civil law tradition. John
Merryman writes the following about that tradition:
There is no such thing as a trial in our sense; there is no single,
concentrated event. The typical civil proceeding in a civil law
country is actually a series of isolated meetings of and written
communications between counsel and the judge, in which evidence is introduced, testimony is given, procedural motions
and rulings are made, and so on. Matters of the sort that
would ordinarily be concentrated into a single event in a common law jurisdiction will be spread over a large number of
acts before the judge who is
discrete appearances18and
8 written
taking the evidence.
Merryman's account of the civil law system echoes Herget and
Camil's description of Mexican civil procedure in pointing out
the absence not only of a trial as such but also of an element of
surprise. Merryman states:
[t]he element of surprise is reduced to a minimum, since each
appearance is relatively brief and involves a fairly small part of
prepare some
the total case. There will be plenty of time to
189
sort of response before the next appearance.
The German procedural system, which has been put forth as a
model for the United States, 19° is also based on a multiplicity of
informal hearings. In German civil procedure:
186. Carlos Angulo Parra, Comments on the Potential Influence of NAFTA on
Procedruesfor the Settlement of Disputes, 1 US-MEx L. J. 29, 30 (1993).
187. Improving Mexican procedure should not be achieved by blindly transplanting common law norms but rather by immanent development. In other words, Mexico should probably seek to perfect its unconcentrated and flexible approach to
procedure instead of completely abandoning that approach in favor of the concentrated and formal common law system. In doing so, Mexico would be well advised
to turn to the experience of other civil law jurisdictions. The Mexican approach
might be improved from the comparative and critical perspectives, along the lines
suggested in the next two sections.
188. Merryman, supra note 99, at 112.
189. Id. at 113.
190. John Langbein submits "that, by assigning judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts, the Germans avoid the most troublesome aspects of our practice." Langbein, supra note 121, at 824.(footnote omitted).
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there is no distinction between pretrial and trial, between discovering evidence and presenting it. Trial is not a single continuous event. Rather, the court gathers and evaluates
evidence over a series of hearings, as many as the circumstances require. 191

Thus, "the various oral hearings in the same case form a unity
and constitute the basis of the judgment". 192 They do not have to
follow a particular sequence. 93 What happens from one hearing
to the next, as well as what happens within each of those hearings, does not have to follow an ironclad pattern.
Civil law appellate process is also characteristically diffuse
and flexible. There is, in fact, no clear demarcation between appellate and trial proceedings. In Germany, for instance, "[t]he
new oral proceeding on appeal is a continuation of the proceeding at trial .... The norms regarding the procedural presuppositions

also

hold

on

appeal.

.

.

.

The

same

kinds

of

procedure.. .and the samekinds of judgment apply as at the trial
94
level."1

Hence, in civil law jurisdictions, both trial and appellate procedural activity takes place in a series of loosely connected oral
and written proceedings. There is no build-up toward a single
all-important procedural event, such as the common law trial or
appellate oral argument. The Mexican approach to the civil pro191. Id. at 823, 826 (footnote omitted). John Langbein insists that even in simpler cases, which are decided in one main hearing, significant procedural differences
between the German and the United States common law system persist. "[E]ven in
such cases, because the court has the option to schedule further hearings if developments at the initial hearing seem to warrant further proofs or submissions, German
procedure is devoid of the opportunities for surprise and tactical advantage that
inhere in the Anglo-American concentrated trial." The German Advantage in Civil

Procedure, Id. at 823, 826-7 n.9. See §136 Nr. 3 ZIVILPROZEI3ORDNUNG (Code of

Civil Procedure)[zPo]. German procedural law cultivates the difference of its civil
proceedings in ways other than by allowing the possibility of further hearings. Regarding the oral hearing, the German Code of Civil Procedure states that "[t]he
parties shall make their submissions in an open discussion." Id. at §137. The format
of the hearing is kept deliberately loose. Judges are given substantial freedom to
structure and run the oral hearing as they see fit. Rosenberg, Schwab and Gottwald,
Id. at § 79, p. 435 ("The direction of the proceedings is the responsibility of the
court by virtue of its office."). Benjamin Kaplan refers to the distinct character of
German civil procedure as the "conference method" of adjudication. Benjamin
Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflectionson the Comparisonsof Systems, 9 BuFF.L. REV.
409, 410 (1960). Langbein, accordingly, underscores the "business-like" character of
German civil procedure: "German civil proceedings have the tone not of the theater, but of a routine business meeting-serious rather than tense." Langbein, supra
note 121, at 831.

192.

ROSENBERG ET AL.,

Zivilprozeprecht § 81, p. 446 (15th ed. 1993).

193. The principle of equivalence "means that one oral hearing is as valid as the
next." Id. at 447.
194. Id. at § 139, 841, 846.
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cess departs from that of the United States not because it is less
developed but because it stems from a different legal tradition.
Merryman cautions, however, that "the trend in civil law jurisdictions has been toward greater concentration, with the rate
of development varying widely.' 95 "Austria and Germany seem
to be moving most rapidly in this direction."'1 96 Mexico has experienced this general development, though certainly to a lesser
extent than Germany or Austria. Mexican legal scholar Rafael
de Pina has argued:
there should be the least number possible of hearings because
the more proximate the procedural activities are to the decision, the lesser the danger that the impression received by the
will be erased and that his memory will
decision-maker
1 97
deceive him.

In their gravitation toward increased concentration, Mexico and
other civil law jurisdictions have moved closer to the common
law world. The Mexican and other civil law systems now tend to
compress procedural activity into a few oral sessions. The civil
law tradition, to the extent possible, reduces the number of oral
meetings and stacks them up against each other. The proceedings that make up the trial thus resemble the common law pretrial and trial hearings, while the proceedings that constitute the
appeal parallel the common law appellate sessions: the prehearing conference and oral argument.
The Mexican and civil law procedural picture has nevertheless preserved its distinctness. The procedural hearings, even
when limited in number, relate to each other differently than in
the common law tradition. There is no internal ranking; there is
no one proceeding that is paramount and to which the others are
subservient. The procedural conferences within the civil law picture handle a multiplicity of issues in a somewhat free-floating
195. Merryman, supra note 99, at 112. This increase in procedural concentration
has been accompanied by an evolution toward orality and immediacy. CARLOS
39 (1992)(citing RAFAEL DE
PI'NA, DICCIONARIO DEL DERECHO 68 (1965)). Arellano Garcia connects the princiARELLANo GARCIA, TEORIA GENERAL DEL PROCESO

ples of concentration, orality, and immediacy. Id. Merryman, in turn, speaks of "the
interrelated criteria of concentration, immediacy, and orality". Merryman, supra
note 99, at 116. He expounds the point thus: "A trend toward immediacy in civil
proceedings carries with it a trend toward orality, and orality is promoted also by the
trend toward concentration. Civil law proceduralists think of the three matters as
related to one another, and one frequently encounters discussion in which concentration, immediacy, and orality are advances as interrelated components of proposals for reform in the law of civil procedure." Id. at 114.
196. Id. at 112. See, e.g., §272 Nr. 1 zPo ("As a rule , the case should be resolved
in a single hearing, comprehensively prepared."); ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note
192, at , § 84, 452.
197. CARLOS ARELLANO GARCIA, TEORIA GENERAL DEL PROCESO 39
(1992)(citing RAFAEL DE PINA, DICCIONARIO DEL DERECHO 68 (1965)).
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way. In addition to the structural uniqueness of the relationship
between the various proceedings, the hearings themselves distinguish themselves in content from their common law equivalents.
They are relatively flexible and unceremonious; they take place
as an open discussion198 and come across as a business conference. 199 Needless to say, civil procedure in Mexico,.as in other
civil law nations, often deviates from the aspirations embodied in
this procedural picture. Nevertheless, one cannot truly understand Mexican civil procedure unless one grasps the kind of process it aims at and the procedural picture within which that
process is embedded.
Though the extent of their involvement in civil procedure
has been exaggerated, civil law judges are more engaged than
their common law counterparts.200 This is certainly the case in
Mexico. Mexican civil judges are very active throughout the judicial proceeding. They must, for instance, reject all "pleadings
that are notoriously frivolous or unmeritorious"; they must "discard them out offhand and do not have to notify the other
party. '201 The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures declares further: "If the complaint were obscure or inadequate, the
judge shall ask the plaintiff to clarify, correct, or complete it...,
pointing out the defects with specificity; once he does this he
shall process it. '' 202
During the preliminary conciliation hearing, moreover, the
Code grants the judge "broad powers in conducting the proceeding."'203 Judges carry their "broad powers" into the evidentiary
phase of procedure, both at the trial and appellate level. They
take a leading role, for instance, in the examination of the witnesses. 20 4 The Code announces: "The judge may, by virtue of his
198. Regarding the oral hearing, the German Code of Civil Procedure states that
"[t]he parties shall make their submissions in an open discussion." §137 zpo.
199. Benjamin Kaplan refers to the distinct character of German civil procedure
as the "conference method" of adjudication. Kaplan, supra note 191, at 410.
Langbein, accordingly, underscores the "business-like" character of German civil
procedure: "German civil proceedings have the tone not of the theater, but of a
routine business meeting-serious rather than tense." Langbein, supra note 121, at
831.
200. Merryman, supra note 99, at 114-15. Merryman concedes that "in Germany
the law and the judicial tradition encourage the judge to play an active role in the
proceedings." Id. at 115.
201. C.P.C.D.F. art. 72 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.c. art. 57 (Mex.) ("Tribunals shall not
admit petitions, pleadings, or motions notoriously malicious or unmeritorious. They
shall discard these papers offhand and do not have to notify the other parties, provide them with a copy, or make a record.").
202. C.P.C.D.F. art. 257(Mex.).
203. Id. at art. 272A.
204. "When a witness testifies, the judge asks the questions, although lawyers for
either side can request the judge to ask certain questions or to explore a certain
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office, broadly interrogate the witnesses with respect to the facts
at issue in the evidentiary hearing in order better to ascertain the
truth. '2 05 Only after making this statement, does the code establish that "the parties may also interrogate the witness".2 06 The
code cautions that the parties "must limit themselves to the disjudge must strictly exclude
puted facts or issues" and adds: "The
2 0°7
questions.
irrelevant
or
pointless
In Mexican procedure, the parties themselves are required
20 8
to make statements, i.e. to provide "confessional evidence.
The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures allows the parties to pose questions to each other during this stage. 20 9 Not surprisingly, the Code also states that "[t]he court may freely
interrogate the parties with respect to the facts and circumstances
relevant to finding out the truth. ' 21 0 Generally, regarding the interrogation of the parties as well as of the witnesses, the Code
declares: "The court shall have the broadest powers to ask witto establishnesses and parties those questions deemed relevant
'21 '
issues."
disputed
the
to
respect
with
ing the truth
The Federal District's Code of Civil Procedures bestows
upon judges extensive powers in the consideration of all evidence, not just testimonial. The parties usually offer the evidence. Yet, the judges, in addition to deciding whether the
12 must "receive and examine it".213
evidence is admissible,2
Judges have substantial latitude in terms of the kind of evidence
upon which they rely:
In order to find out the truth about the disputed issues, the
judge may rely on any person (parties as well as others), object
or document (belonging to the parties or others). The only
may not be prohibited by law or
limitation is that the evidence
2 4
be morally objectionable. 1
subject in his interrogation. There is no cross examination."

HERGET & CAMIL,
supra note 147, at 74.
205. C.P.C.D.F. art. 392 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.c. art. 179 (Mex.) ("The tribunal
shall have the broadest authority to ask witnesses and parties questions deemed conducive to the acertainment of the truth ... ").
206. C.P.C.D.F. art. 392 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.C. art. 173 (Mex.).
207. C.P.C.D.F. art. 392 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.C. art. 175 (Mex.).
208. C.P.C.D.F. art. 308, 389 (Mex.).
209. C.P.C.D.F. art. 317, 389 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.C. art. 102 (Mex.).
210. C.P.C.D.F. art. 318 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.c. art. 113 (Mex.) ("While presiding
over the confessions session, the court may freely interrogate the parties about any
facts or circumstances that might contribute to ascertaining the truth of the
matter.").
211. C.P.C.D.F. art. 366 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.C. art. 179 (Mex.). See generally
Bautista, supra note 158, at 125-26.
212. C.P.C.D.F. art. 298 (Mex.). See generally Bautista, supra note 158, at 104-05.
213. C.P.C.D.F. art. 299 (Mex.). See generally Bautista, supra note 158, at 106.
214. C.P.C.D.F. art. 278 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.C. art. 79 (Mex.) ("In order to ascertain the truth, the adjudicator may rely on any person-both parties and third parties-
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Judges also have great discretion in deciding how the evidence will be examined and evaluated. 2 15 The judges' broad authority to examine evidence includes the right "personally [to]
inspect items or physical evidence including premises." 216
The courts may, at any time and in any kind of case, order the
execution and extension of any kind of evidentiary hearing, if
conducive to the ascertainment of the truth with respect to the
contested issues. In conducting these hearing, the judge shall
proceed as he sees fit in order to obtain the best result, without violating the rights of the 2parties.
He must listen to the
17
parties and treat them equally.

"Articles 278 and 279 give the judge very broad powers with respect to the timing of the production of evidence, the manner in
which the production of evidence is carried out, and the kind of
'21 8
evidentiary means to be utilized.
"At the end of the reception of the evidence the court shall
order the parties to make allegations-personally or through
their attorneys: first the plaintiff and then the defendant." 219
This phase sounds quite similar to the closing arguments at trial
or to appellate oral argument in the common law systems.
Again, the Mexican trial or appellate judge is more involved:
The courts shall direct the debate, admonishing the parties to
concentrate themselves on the disputed issues and to avoid digressions. The courts may interrupt the parties to request exand on any thing or document-whether it belongs to the parties or to third parties.
The only limitation is that the evidence be recognized by law and be immediately
related to the disputed facts."). See generally EDUARDO PALLARES, DERECHO
PROCESAL CIVIL 357 (1978); Bautista, supra note 158, at 100.
215. See, e.g., C.F.P.C. art. 197 (Mex.) ("The court has the broadest liberty to analyze the evidence offered and to evaluate and compare the different evidentiary
items, and to arrive at a conclusion with respect to this comparative evaluation.").
216. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 147, at 74. See C.F.P.C. art. 161 (Mex.) ("Judicial inspection may be carried out-at the parties' request or by the court's motion
and with due notice-whenever it might serve to clarify or determine the controversy's facts that require no special technical knowledge.").
217. C.P.C.D.F. art. 279 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.c. art. 80 (Mex.). See generally Pallares, supra note 169, at 357; Bautista, supra note 158, at 98-99.
218. Pallares, supra note 169, at 357. See also C.F.P.C. art. 79 (Mex.) ("The court
shall face no time limit when ordering the production of the evidence it considers
indispensable to judge to form an opinion with respect to the litigation's content.
None of the limitations and prohibitions on evidentiary matters imposed on the parties shall apply to the court.").
219. C.P.C.D.F. art. 393 (Mex.). See also C.F.P.C. art. 344 (Mex.) ("At the end of
the discussion [of the evidence], the hearing of allegations shall begin, in which the
following rules shall be observed: (I) The secretary shall read those parts of the
record requested by the party speaking; (II) The plaintiff shall make his allegations
first and then the defendant. The Public Ministry shall make allegations if it is a
party in the case; (III) Each party may speak only twice and in his reply shall make
allegations about the underlying issues as well as about the issues that came up in
the the process.").

1997]

PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

253

to
planations and they may interrogate
220 the parties with respect
those issues they deem relevant.
Carlos Arellano Garcia elaborates on the judge's obligations during this proceeding:
The adjudicator has a duty to direct the debates. This means
that his role in the evolving hearing during the procedural period of allegations is not merely passive. He may interrupt the
litigants to demand explanations and interrogate them, as he
sees fit, about the issues-i.e., about the evidence
22 1in the record
or about other matters related to the process.
Unlike their counterparts in the common law, Mexican judges
must, in essence, argue along with the attorneys for the parties.
Mexican trial and appellate judges are thus more involved
throughout the civil process than common law judges. Beyond
all the instances of wide procedural engagement already mentioned, Mexican judges are bound by a judicial obligation unknown in the common law world. The civil law duty of process
direction has been described in the following terms:
The court has a duty to carry forward the procedure lawfully
and purposively, to process the legal dispute exhaustively and
expeditiously, and to bring the dispute to an end in the most
efficient way. This engagement by the court is called process
direction. This is one of the court's most important tasks, inasmuch as the final judgment on the goods and the adequacy of
the procedure depend on it. .. . The process's direction is the

court's responsibility by virtue of its office and does not require the parties' motion or a request. Nor can the parties
deliberrelieve the court of this duty. The court must dutifully222
ate upon those decisions placed within its discretion.
The parties get the case started but "keeping in motion the already begun process is in essence the court's task. '2 23 The parties may provide assistance in this task, but the ultimate
responsibility rests with the court. In imposing the duty of prodracess direction on the judge, the Mexican procedural picture 224
counterpart.
law
common
its
from
apart
itself
matically sets
220. C.P.C.D.F. art. 395 (Mex.).
221. CARLOS ARELLANO GARCIA, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 434 (1981).

222. See, e.g., ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 192, at § 79, 435.
223. Id. at 436.
224. The principle of process direction sounds like what Carlos Arellano Garcia
denominates the principle of procedural impulsion. CARLOS ARELLANO GARCIA,
TEORIA GENERAL DEL PROCESo 39 (1992). Yet, Arellano Garcia attributes the
principle to the parties and not to the judge. "Procedural impulse," according to
him, "is the pressure exerted by one of the parties on the process to move on to the
to the next stage." Id. See also EDUARDO PALLARES, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO
PROCESAL CIVIL 595 (1966) ("The process unfolds until it comes to a conclusion at
the parties' initiative. The parties must make the necessary motions to this end. The
judge is not allowed to take over this role, except in exceptional cases."). If Arellano Garcia believes that the direction of the process also is the parties' duty, he is
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In conclusion, the Mexican civil law procedural picture differs immensely from the U.S. common law picture. Within the
Mexican picture, there are no peremptory challenges; the short
pleading stages does not aim at distilling a limited set of issues
for a trial; judgments include short opinions and no dissents or
concurrences; the appeal involves no factual deference to the
trial court; and the losing party pays the attorney's fees. More
importantly, the Mexican picture calls for a systematically integrated procedural code, a series of loosely connected oral and
written proceedings which gradually define the issues, and a decision maker in charge of moving the process forward.
VI.

THE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The assertion that the Mexican civil law approach to procedure is superior to the common law approach is as incorrect and
pointless as its opposite. Claims of this sort are usually associated with an attitude of tribalism that precludes any possibility of
an enlightened conversation about legal divergence. My main
aim has been simply to show that Mexico has a distinct and valuable picture of civil procedure, partly because of its civil law heritage. It is unfortunate that the debate on dispute resolution in
the North American Free Trade Agreement, particularly in the
area of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, did not appreciate Mexico's different procedural picture. By openly drawing on
the different national pictures, the Agreement's framers would
have been able to design a richer international procedure.
Even when they have incorporated more than one nation's
procedural mechanisms into the new international procedure, international jurists have typically failed to face the fact that the
real challenge is to generate not just a novel but a coherent picture of procedure. If they limit themselves to technically connecting procedural devices that are narrowly consistent with each
other or randomly incorporating procedures from the various
legal systems involved, they risk ending up with a tossed salad of
discrete procedural mechanisms that do not mesh conceptually. 225 These mechanisms might be capable of coexisting without directly undermining each other; yet, they will not reinforce
each other. They will not form a coherent picture of procedure.
wrong. He may mean, however, that the parties must initiate the action and keep it
alive. I will actually agree with this assertion in my discussion of the dispositive
principle in § VII. This position does not exclude the possibility of imposing on the
judge the duty to direct the action that the parties initiate and maintain.
225. I am indebted to Detlef Leenen for pressing upon me the reality of this
danger.
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If international jurists understood and valued each procedural picture on its own terms, however, they would probably be
less inclined to patch together, mindlessly, a selection of diverse

elements from the various pictures. They might instead fully realize the intricate way in which the multiple aspects of the various pictures hang together. They would be more aware that the

diverse features of the new procedural picture must be similarly
well-knit. They would ultimately aim at a procedural picture

with aesthetic value in the sense of "unity in diversity" or "organic unity".2 2 6 They would seek, in the words of Robert Nozick,

"to integrate great diversity of material into a tight unity, often in
vivid and striking ways."'2 27 They would cease to be plumbers
and become architects of procedure.
The comparative approach thus leads to the creation of a
diverse but unified new international procedural picture. 228 The
comparative standpoint would have enabled the framers of the
panel procedure to draw on the Mexican as well as the Canadian
and U.S. procedural pictures in bringing to life a new international procedural picture. By the same token, the comparative

perspective might make it possible at this point to transform the
current international procedural system by coherently incorporating some features of the Mexican procedural picture. The re-

formed procedure might not only resolve disputes in a more
effective manner, but also, by virtue of its versatility, blend better

with the very different national procedural systems with which it
interacts. 22 9 In this section, I will sketch a few ideas on how to
226.

ROBERT NoZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE

163 (1989).

227. Id.

228. The construction of a new international procedural picture along these lines
is not exactly like the formation of novel national procedural picture. Inasmuch as
the national and the international contexts differ, their corresponding procedural
pictures will also diverge. It is nonetheless important to keep in mind that the process of generating a national procedural picture and that of creating an international
picture give rise to similar general questions.
229. See Angel R. Oquendo, NAFTA's Procedural Narrow-Mindedness: The
PanelReview of Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Determinations Under Chapter Nineteen, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 61, 65 (1995) (Chapter 19 imposes on the Mexican
legal system a procedural superstructure based on an alien legal tradition.) See also
Koteen, supra note 28, at 841. ("The procedural rules for binational panels and extraordinary challenge committees under Article 1904 should work well, as they were
negotiated based upon recently amended U.S.-Canada rules of procedure. Nevertheless, there is less assurance that the system will function smoothly with the introduction of Mexico's civil law system than with the similar common law systems of
the United States and Canada."); Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA:
Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW 707, 714 (1993)
("In the case of the NAFTA panels involving Mexico, panelists will be required to
bridge even wider cultural and legal gaps. Unlike both Canada and the United
States, Mexico is a civil law country, not a common law country. In addition, Mexico
does not have the trade law history and experience of either the United States or
Canada. Language differences will present new challenges generally not encoun-
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enrich the existing international procedural scheme from the
comparative perspective.
Some of the changes contemplated will require a modifica-

tion of the written parameters of the procedure,i.e., Article 1904
or the Rules of Procedure. 230 Others will simply call for a trans-

formation in the approach to and the implementation of those
parameters. In fact, one noteworthy addition to the Panel Rules
when they were incorporated into the North American Free

Trade Agreement is that a panel "may refer for guidance to
Rules of procedure of a court that would otherwise have had jurisdiction in the importing country" whenever "a procedural
23 1
question arises that is not covered by [the Panel Rules]".
Thus, a panel reviewing a Mexican determination is explicitly au-

thorized to invoke Mexican procedures in resolving unsettled
procedural questions. Of course, a panel may generally rely on
Mexican principles in any case when dealing with procedural
questions that it cannot answer by referring to the Panel
Rules.

232

The comparative reform effort should not underestimate the
difficulty of introducing changes that require no amendment of
the Rules. After all, such modifications call upon the panelists to
alter their conditioned reflexes in a given procedural situation.
tered in CFTA proceedings. In these respects NAFTA panels will face new complications."); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, BinationalDispute Settlement under Chapter19 of
the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal,24 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 269, 338 (1991) ("[T]he procedural solution to a previously intractable problem of substance was possible only because of a similar legal/administrative
tradition, so that the panel review procedure could be designed as a surrogate for a
familiar institution of judicial review of administrative action. Without such a tradition, and without a detailed statutory framework in Mexico, caution seems in order
before assuming that the Canada-United States experience can readily be adapted to
a trade relationship among the three countries.").
230. Stacy J. Ettinger believes that making amendments to the rules should not
be too difficult. "The NAFTA rules of procedure and regulations," she explains,
"are intended to provide for the smooth functioning of the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanisms. As issues arise that are not adequately addressed under these
rules and regulations, the Parties may meet to review and renegotiate as appropriate." Stacy J.Ettinger, NAFTA Chapter Nineteen: Rules of Procedure and Regulations, 863 PLI/Coi' 809 (1994): The rules were actually amended shortly before the
transition from the Canada-United States to the North American Free Trade Agreement. Yet, because of the controversy surrounding the panel review process in general, getting the parties to agree on substantial changes to the rules may turn out to
be very complicated. The government of Mexico might have a particularly hard
time persuading its trading partners to Mexicanize the panel review system.
231. 1904 PR 2.
232. Rule 2 declares: "Where a procedural question arises that is not covered by
these rules, a panel may adopt the procedure to be followed in the particular case
before it by analogy to these rules." 1904 PR 2. The permissive language here suggests that when there is no direct answer and only an answer by analogy, the panel
also has the option of disregarding the analogy and proceeding as it sees fit.
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Most panelists will have a common law background and will be
hard-pressed to embrace a civil law point of view. Because of the
procedural system's common law bias, even panelists brought in
by Mexico will either have had common law training or significant exposure to the common law system.
The comparative reformation would unfold more sensibly if
it constructed first the novel picture's more basic features and
then, gradually, other elements. In this way, the former would
give the picture a particular form and the latter would simply
have to fit in. This section's discussion will proceed accordingly,
moving from the more central to the more peripheral procedural
aspects examined in the previous two sections. I will derive my
recommendations on the first of the main aspects, i.e., the conception of the nature and role of written procedural precepts,
from the very notion of the comparative perspective. I will base
my proposals on the two other pivotal issues, the procedural
structure and the decision maker's role, on a close examination
of the particular controversy with which the 1904 procedural system has to deal. Only after analyzing these fundamental procedural matters will I make suggestions on the other procedural
items.
The comparative perspective is obviously more amenable to
the civil law view of the nature and role of written precepts. Inasmuch as the it seeks to forge a new picture, the comparative
project will tend to regard those precepts as outlining such a picture. It will lean toward the civil law tradition in demanding the
enactment and application of procedural precepts not as an aggregate set of rules but as a coherent whole. The choice between
referring to those standards as "rules" or as a "code" is in itself
immaterial. What is essential is the interconnection and inner
logic of the underlying principles. In originating and interpreting
any of these norms, international jurists should refer not only to
other norms but also to the larger meaning expressed by the totality of norms.
The comparatively transformed international procedure
should nevertheless shun the overtones of the civil law tradition.
Civil law jurists often .regard the procedural code as representing
an abstract system from which adjudicators simply derive particular applications. This reading precludes a pragmatic approach
to concrete questions. The ideal solution would be to see the
procedural code as expressing not a scientific system but a procedural picture. The particular applications would not be automatic
nor exclude practical judgment. Decision makers would have to
construct creatively the written precepts on the basis of the underlying picture. The picture only provides a framework to deal
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with the specific procedural questions that arise. The picture,
moreover, is not fixed; it evolves with every new interpretation.
In order to continue developing an eclectic but reasonable
international procedural picture, it is crucial to understand the
context in which that procedure must operate. In other words,
international actors must study the kind of dispute that the decision maker has to resolve. Only then will it be possible to work
some existing procedural concepts and some new ones into a
new procedural picture, capable of settling those disputes adequately. The particular controversy that the panel must resolve
is that between, on the one hand, the importing country and the
domestic producers and, on the other hand, the exporting country and the foreign exporters. The importing country, usually
goaded by the domestic producers, starts an antidumping or
countervailing duty proceeding against the exporters at the administrative level. Once the investigating authority issues its final determination, either the exporting country, at the insistence
of the foreign exporters, or the importing country, at the suggestion of the domestic producers, requests a panel review.
The controversy turns on the highly technical question of
whether the exporters are dumping merchandise or benefiting
from an illegitimate subsidy.2 33 In dumping cases, the investigating authority must determine what is a comparable merchandise
in the exporting country or, under some circumstances, in a third
country. 234 It is also key to decide whether, and if so to what

extent, there is a price difference between the exported merchandise and the comparable merchandise, making "all of the necessary price adjustments to reflect differences in selling expenses,
transportation costs, excise taxes, customs duties, and the
like. ....
",235 In subsidy cases, the investigating authority must
establish whether there has been any kind of "support, stimulus,
incentive, premium, bounty, grant, or benefit, bestowed directly
or indirectly, by a government upon its domestic citizenry, including producers, resellers, or exporters of merchandise," and
whether such benefits are granted "contingent, in law or in fact
.. ,I

upon export performance.

. .

or export earnings," or be-

stowed not generally but on a specific class of beneficiaries. 236
The international panel must determine whether the administra233. See GATT art. VI
1 & 3.
234. See GATI art. VI T 1.
235. Craig R. Giesze, Mexico's New Antidumping and CountervailingDuty System: Policy and Legal Implications,As Well As PracticalBusiness Risks and Realities, for United States Exporters to Mexico in the Era of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 885, 899 (1994)(footnote omitted); See GATT
art. VI 2.
236. Id. at 908.
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tive agency dealt with all these issues appropriately in light of the
specific principles set forth in the importing country's trade
laws. 237 As already noted, the panel has to employ the same
standard of review as the tribunal that would normally review the
determination.
In view of the complexity of the issues involved,2 38 the comparative approach would suggest following the civil law model in
order to make the procedure less concentrated and structurally
rigid. The most obvious way of achieving this objective would be
to abolish the hub-and-spoke construction that the Agreement
and the Rules establish for the panel review scheme. Under this
arrangement, the oral argument is at the hub and the other procedural devices, such as pleadings, hearings on motions, briefs,
and pre- and post-hearing conferences, constitute the spokes.
The amended Rules would simply provide for a series of writings
and hearings through which to define and decide the general case
as well as specific issues. Of course, another option would be to
work with the existing procedural apparatus. In other words,
panelists would treat the other procedural mechanisms as having
equal standing with the oral argument. They would regard the
prescribed writings and hearings as a series of business documents and meetings through which panelists and attorneys discuss openly the intricacies of the case.
It would be fundamental to prevent any move towards less
concentration from leading to redundancy and delay. Even if it
succeeded in amending the Agreement and the Rules, the comparative reform would preserve strict deadlines. It would require
the panelists to conduct the entire review within the current 315day time limit. 239 An additional possibility would be, following
the German model, 240 to urge the panelists to try to settle all the
237. NAFA, art. 1904 T 2.
238. Burke & Walsh, supra note 30, at 534; see also Deyling, supra note 20, at 358
("These [antidumping and countervailing duty] determinations are, of course, difficult to make and involve detailed analyses of numerous economic factors, including
domestic and foreign production costs, the volume of imports and exports, and the
impact of imports on domestic prices."); Giesze, supra note 235, at 897. Dumping
and government subsidization constitute "a topic so esoteric that only a few individuals are actually familiar with them." (quoting Dispute Resolution and Unfair Trade
Practices: Hearings on the Negotiation of NAFTA: Hearing Transcript, part 8(a),

LRC 3, Mexican Senate, Mexico City, Mex. (Nov. 13, 1992) (statement of Alvaro
Baillet Gallardo)). Giesze, in turn, reports that "many commentators generally
agree with Dr. Baillet's characterization, considering that the study, analysis, and
regulation of dumping and government subsidy practices constitute an arcane and
overly complicated subject." Giesze, supra note 235, at 897. Giesze nonetheless
insists that the rudiments are easy to grasp. Id.
239. NAFTA, art. 1904 14.
240. As amended in 1976, the German Code of Civil Procedure reads: "As a
rule, the case should be resolved in a single hearing, comprehensively prepared."
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issues with only one hearing. But the Rules would have to underscore the option of having more hearings. The panelists
would not feel that they had to stage the proceeding so that when
it closed the discussion automatically ended. Allowing for the
possibility of more than one hearing, each being equal in importance, would loosen the procedural setup and allow the discussion to run its course.
In addition to abandoning the concentrated procedural
structure, the comparative project would recommend altering the
format of the oral argument and other hearings to allow more of
a free exchange between the decision makers and the attorneys.
There would be no need to amend the Rules for this purpose.
They explicitly empower the panelists to deviate from the default
format according to which the complainant argues first, then the
investigating authority, and finally the complainant replies.2 41
Even if they adhered to the default format, the comparatively
transformed panelists would use their interventions to turn the
proceeding into a real discussion on the technical issues involved,
as sometimes happens in the U.S. appellate practice. They would
interrupt counsel to keep her on the issues,2 42 to clear up her
assertions, to contradict her contentions, to force her to confront
her adversary's arguments.
The panelists would thus use their interventions to undertake their own investigation into the matter and not just to clarify, contrast, and choose between the participant's positions. The
ultimate goal would be to make the hearing into a business conference, along the lines contemplated in the procedural picture I
described in the previous section. In such a meeting, the panelists would be better able to conduct a thorough examination of
the numerous business-related issues involved. The panel would
allow the participants, through counsel, to provide their input
but not to control the public deliberation.
This, to be sure, is no earth-shattering change. In fact, the
panelists already take a very active posture in some cases. 243 The
§272 Nr. 1 zpo. "The simplification amendment of 1976," a leading treatise notes,
"imposed on the courts more emphatically the duty finally to dispose of the legal
dispute through a comprehensively prepared oral hearing, i.e., the main hearing....
The experience with the new law up to now has been that courts actually take advantage of the opportunity to speed up the procedure." ROSENBERG ET AL., supra
note 192, at § 84, 452.
241. 1904 Panel R. 67(2).
242. "Oral argument," acccording to rule 67(5), "shall be limited to the issues in
dispute." 1904 Panel R. 67(5). Presumably, the panelist may enforce this rule by
stopping the argument and insisting on a return to the issues in dispute.
243. See Moyer, supra note 39, at 714. ("Five-member binational panels tend to
be inquisitive. CFFA panel hearings commonly last several hours or
more. ")(footnote omitted).
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suggestion here is simply to move to a procedural picture in
which such engagement by the panel members becomes the
norm. The panelists would see themselves as working through a
set of complex issues, paying attention to the concerns of the affected parties as voiced by the attorneys. They would not conceive of their mission as just choosing between alternative
solutions offered by the parties.
The transition to a less concentrated procedural structure
and to a flexible, business-conference model of the proceeding
would both require and reinforce the emergence of a more engaged decision maker. The procedure would unravel and the
hearings would be chaotic without the panel's careful direction.
The panelists would therefore have to define the agenda, guide
the exchanges, determine when to allow or disallow the attorneys' input, and decide when to close the debate for the day or
for good. This general increase in involvement by the panelists,
particularly during the oral proceedings, would not require a
change in the Agreement or the Rules.
A radical change in the decision maker's constitution, however, would facilitate this transformation of the decision maker's
function. The comparatively reformed procedure would accord244
ingly substitute the ad hoc panels with a permanent tribunal.
Instituting such a permanent court would require doing away
with the provisions of the Agreement that control the selection
and operation of the panels.245 A permanent tribunal would be
much better situated than an ad hoc panel adopt an attitude of
procedural engagement, along the lines proposed. 246 In addition
to their potential common law bias, panelists (as already noted)
will seldom have the time or the energy to play a proactive role
244. See Moreno & Ochoa, supra note 11, at 713.("It is possible that the panel
system may need to be replaced by permanent courts. One factor that could lead to
this is the fact that trained individuals who can act as panelists are increasingly
scarce. Also, Mexico's inclusion into the system of panels poses serious problems,
namely, the complexities of adding a civil jurisdiction and a third language, which
would require specialists that only a permanent tribunal could provide."); Debra P.
Steger, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in UNDERSTANDING THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 49,50 (Donald M. McRae

& Debra P. Steger Eds. 1988) ("[T]he advantage of a permanent court for the resolution of trade disputes is that it provides greater internal consistency."). "The main
disadvantage of these courts," according to Garcia Moreno and Herndndez Ochoa,
"is political. The appointment of judges would give rise to opposition as the appointments are debated in each country." Moreno & Ochoa, supra note 11, at 714.
245. This would also mean doing away with the peremptory challenge system,
which (as already noted) is taken from the common law tradition.
246. This opens up the question of the manner in which judges on such a permanent court would be selected to guarantee independence, competence, and fairness.
The comparative and the critical perspectives would undoubtedly help in addressing
this question.
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in the procedure as a whole. A permanent court, in contrast,
would be able to develop a strategy of procedural management
over a series of cases and would have the additional incentive of

knowing that it may apply the already formed strategy to many
cases into the future. It would probably enjoy more prestige and
develop more judicial expertise than the ad hoc panels and would

incidentally eliminate the conflict-of-interest problem associated
with a system in which the panelists in one case may be attorneys
in another. 2 47 The comparatively amended Rules would assign

cases to a panel of judges rather than to a single judge in order to
preserve the dialogic advantage of multiple decision makers,

which commentators
have pointed out in the context of the ex2 48
isting system.
The final goal would be to shift the ultimate responsibility
for process direction from the participants to the tribunal. The
tribunal would thus be in a position not only to keep the process

going but also to give the process the direction it considers most
appropriate. In light of the complexity of the issues involved, the
diversity of the interests presented, and the power imbalance be-

tween the participants, not only must the procedure shed its
structural rigidity but also the decision maker must be able, pro-

cedurally, to stay on top of the case. Antidumping and countervailing duty cases are not unlike those cases in which U.S.
procedure has tended to flow towards the counterpictures of ad
hoc pre-trial litigation and the "managerial judge". 249
Upon thus transforming basic procedural elements such as

the conception of the rules, the procedure's structure, and the
adjudicator's role, the comparative approach would proceed to
alter other features of the Article 1904 review scheme. After
247. See Deyling, supra note 20, at 356.("While panelists are carefuly selected
based on their knowledge of trade law, objectivity, and judgment, they serve on an
ad hoc basis and no not enjoy the usual protections associtated with judicial independence."); Burke & Walsh, supra note 30, at 562.("International trade attorneys
appearing before the agency as counsel for private parties and also serving as panelists in other simultaneous cases represent an inherent opportunity for bias.").
248. Burke & Walsh have claimed that: "It may be that some benefit is derived
from the fact that issues are reviewed, in the first instance, by a panel rather than by
a single individual." Burke & Walsh, supra note 30, at 533. See also Moyer, supra
note 39, at 714. ("Like arguments before panels of three or more judges, the dynamics of hearings before five-member panels frequently differ from single-judge hearings. Five-member binational panels tend to be inquisitive. CFTA panel hearings
commonly last several hours or more. Presumably the deliberative and decisionmaking process of panels likewise reflects both the advantages and complications of
adjudicating as a panel.") (footnote omitted). As already cited, Andreas F.
Lowenfeld has pointed out that "it seems that the collective decision-making of the
panels results in less variation from one panel to another than, for instance, from
one judge to another in the Court of International Trade." Lowenfeld, supra note
229.
249. Resnik, supra note 140, at 378.

1997]

PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

263

thus sketching the contours of the new procedural picture, the
comparative reform would deal with other aspects on the basis of
that sketch. With the institution of a permanent court, for instance, the panel selection method, including the peremptory
challenges, would become superfluous. The comparative effort
would call for an elimination of the language on that method in
the Agreement.2 5 0 Secondly, the pleadings would not have to
distill from the case a set of issues that the decision makers can
handle in a single proceeding. Within the procedural picture, the
pleadings would play an equal part in the procedure, along with
and not subservient to the oral argument. The pleadings would
serve, together with the other procedural mechanisms, to define
the issues as the process unfolds. There would be no need to
amend the written parameters to this end.
A decrease in accountability should not, however, accompany the increase in the responsibilities and powers of the decision maker. It would therefore be a mistake to shift to the civil
law approach to opinion writing. Opinions would have to be detailed and well-reasoned, in accordance with the common law
tradition. The court would also have the common law power to
establish precedent. The panels currently do not have this authority though they frequently refer to previous panel opinions.2 51 Furthermore, the Rules would continue to encourage
concurring or dissenting judges to expound their views in writing.
The judicial debate would take place out in the open. A procedural picture that invests the decision makers with extensive procedural power should require them to disclose their reasons. The
inner logic of the new procedural picture would thus insist on the
preservation of the existing practice with respect to opinions. It
is worth noting that observers of the panel review procedure
250. NAFTA, annex 1901.2 2.
251. See Burke & Walsh, supra note 30, at 545-46.("[P]anels do cite to previous
panel decisions. While such decisions do not have the effect of precedent, panel
members may view previous panel decisions as persuasive on a particular matter.");
Moyer, supra note 39. ("[P]anel decisions have tended to be substantively consistent
with one another. Notwithstanding the fact that the composition of panels differs
from case to case, results before Chapter 19 panels have not tended to be either
erratic or contradictory. Consistency among panel decisions has undoubtedly been
enhanced by the inclination of panels to cite to earlier panel decisions that they have
found to be particularly persuasive in their analysis or discussion of applicable
law.... As the case law from CFTA and the NAFTA panels accumulates, it may
thus become an important resource for domestic courts presented with similar issues. Although panel decisions are not binding precedents, the Parties have long
understood that domestic courts might draw on them."). Lowenfeld observes that
"it seems that the collective decision-making of the panels results in less variation
from one panel to another than, for instance, from one judge to another in the Court
of International Trade." Lowenfield, supra note 229.
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have not only praised the panelists generally, but specifically the
252

opinions the panelists have produced.
On the fourth issue, i.e., the conception of the appeal, the

comparative approach would recommend the incorporation of
the civil law method. The court would review final determinations de novo. Since the judges would be experts and most of the
evidence would be documental, there would be little justification

for deferring to the investigating authority. Further, the court

would better fulfill its mission, which is to curb the use of antidumping and countervailing duties as trade barriers, if it were

able to arrive at its own, independent assessment of the evidence.

The present system allows the investigating authority to impose
unjustified duties as long as there is no abuse of discretion. The
proposed change would depend on an amendment to the Agreement in order to provide for de novo review of final determina-

tions, irrespective of what the standard of review of the domestic
courts.

252. Burke & Walsh, for instance, contend that: "A review of the decisions issued by the panels makes it apparent that, in most cases, the panels have conscientiously attempted to address all of the issues placed before them. The decisions
issued by the panels are often voluminous and often contain thorough discussions of
the legal issues which have been presented to the panel. It may be that some benefit
is derived from the fact that issues are reviewed, in the first instance, by a panel
rather than by a single individual. It may also be that the practice experience of the
panel members and their interest in the area of international trade law serves panel
members well. Several commentators have noted the high quality of panel decisions." Burke & Walsh, supra note 30, at 533. (citing Judith H. Bello et al., U.S.
Trade Law and Policy Series No. 18: Midterm Report on BinationalDispute Settlement Under the United States-CanadaFree- Trade Agreements, 25 INT'L LAWYER 489,
516 (1991); Lowenfield, supra note 229; Moyer, supra note 45, at 722. ("CFTA Chapter 19 panels, on the whole, have demonstrated a high degree of conscientiousness
and professionalism. Counsel appearing before Chapter 19 panels routinely face
panelists who are exceptionally well prepared. Panel decisions frequently include
detailed analyses of the relevant law of the importing Party and careful discussions
of the facts. Opinions typically reflect a diligent effort on the part of the panelists to
apply the law fairly and correctly. Indeed, some of the most thoughtful discussions
of difficult issues to appear anywhere-for example, specificity -are found in opinions
of CFTA binational panels.")(footnote omitted)("CFTA Chapter 19 panels have, on
the whole, performed impressively. Panel members have exhibited high levels of
preparedness, expertise, and conscientiousness. The quality of panel opinions has
also generally been high. And panels have demonstrated an ability to avoid resolving contentious issues along national lines. These accomplishments reflect well on
both the panelists and those who administer the panel process."); Greenberg, Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade
Agreement: Implicationsfor the Court of InternationalTrade, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 37, 42 (1993) ("panelists approach their task seriously, cautiously, and with a
respect for the pronouncements of the courts"); Lowenfield, supra note 229. ("In
both [Chapter 18 and 19] procedures, the panelists have been thoughtful; their opinions have been thorough and articulate, and their conclusions on the whole
persuasive.").
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This modification might seem too controversial inasmuch as
a key compromise during the Article 1904 negotiations was that
the panels would apply the same substantive law, including standard of review, as the replaced domestic courts. In fact, an oftheard criticism of the panels is that in some cases they allegedly
fail to adhere faithfully to the domestic standards of review, par-

ticularly that of the United States. Critics have contended that,
because of their different legal background, Canadian and espe-

cially Mexican panelists do not and cannot apply the U.S. standard of review as a United States judge would. 253 To the extent
that they believe that jurists are incapable of administering correctly a foreign standard of review, however, these objectors

should welcome, not resist, an attempt to do away with the variable standard. They ought to support the adoption of a uniform

de novo standard of review. Decision makers experienced in different legal systems would have to decide cases as a matter of
first impression and their divergent views on the appropriate
level of appellate scrutiny would play no role. Furthermore, the
comparative reform could classify the new standard of review as
"procedure" so as to preserve the claim that the international
decision maker applied the same substantive law as the domestic
courts.

254

On a separate but related issue, the comparative project
would suggest modifying the Rules to permit the decision maker
to follow the Mexican model of appellate review and consider
additional evidence under certain circumstances. Under the existing procedure, if the panel determines that more evidence is
necessary, it has to remand the case so that the investigating au-

thority may admit the new evidence and reconsider the original
determination. 255 This process is cumbersome and therefore inconsistent with the procedure's central aspiration to reasonable
253. Deyling, for instance, argues that the U.S. legal principles, including the
standard of review, "may be especially difficult for foreign panelists to apply. At
least two members of every panel are either Canadian or Mexican, and there is no
guaranteee that they will understand United States trade law. Particularly with respect to Mexico, contrasts between the civil-law and common-law approaches to
cases may complicate a panel's mission to be a mirror image of the [Court of International Trade] in a particular case." Deyling, supra note 20, at 356.
254. The statement that "a panel must operate precisely as would the court it
replaces" has to be limited to substantive issues. 139 Cong. Rec. S16,105 (daily ed.
Nov. 18, 1993)(statement of Sen. Moynihan). If panels were really expected to function procedurally as domestic courts it would make no sense to define a special procedure for the panels in the Agreement and in the accompanying rules. Of course,
the whole substance/procedure dichotomy "is more problematic" than usually assumed. Cover, 0. Fiss, & J. Resnick, Procedure 177 (1988).
255. The rules do not provide for the consideration of additional evidence. The
panel has to remand pursuant to NAFTA art. 1904 8 so that the investigating
authority may consider further evidence.
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speed. Moreover, in these cases much of the evidence is documental and the decision maker may consider it without much
procedural complication. An expert tribunal could examine even
non-documental evidence relatively efficiently in a flexible hearing, in the tradition of the civil law.
All these factors militate in favor of amending the procedural guidelines more broadly to grant the decision maker the
prerogative of reversing and entering a new determination in all
cases. Some analysts have criticized as unnecessarily dilatory the
requirement that the panel remand all cases in which it disagrees
with the investigating authority.2 56 The comparatively transformed procedure should grant the decision maker the option
of, on the one hand, fashioning a new determination based on its
own understanding of the law and facts or, on the other hand,
remanding the case to the investigating authority whenever
deemed appropriate. This type of setup would strike a reasonable balance between the civil law and the common law styles.
Finally, the new procedure would stay clear of the civil law
tradition's approach to litigation costs. Potential complainants
with a genuine claim would be less inclined, especially if they had
limited funds, to request review because they would know that
they would have to pay their opponent's expenses if the decision
maker did not agree with them. To prevent frivolous suits it
would suffice to have a rule imposing the costs on the party filing
such a suit. From the comparative perspective, it therefore
makes sense to keep Rule 32 providing that each party shall pay
its own participation costs. 25 7
VII.

THE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The comparative perspective thus yields numerous insights
on how to create a new international procedural picture as well
as how to change an existing one. The comparative approach
consists of studying various existing procedural pictures and then
coherently working select elements from those pictures into a
new procedural picture adapted to the particular international
context involved. This approach, on the one hand, focuses on
256. See, e.g., Moyer, supra note 39, at 12 ("Delays in finally resolving Chapter
19 cases have resulted not so much from panels failing to meet prescribed deadlines,
but from the remand process."). "Delays through one or more remands," Moyer
explains, "may be traceable in part to the fact that article 1904 empowers panels
only 'to uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent with
the panel's decision.' This formulation stops short of expressly authorizing panels to
reverse agency determinations, even where a panel finds an agency's action clearly
to be legally erroneous or unsupported by substantial record evidence." Id. at 13
(footnote omitted).
257. 1904 Panel R. 32.
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those features with respect to which the contemplated pictures
diverge, carefully selecting whatever is most appropriate for the
given context and rationally integrating the diverse elements into
a new picture. On the other hand, the comparatively transformed procedure just takes over the features shared by the existing pictures, either as they are or adjusted to the relevant
international circumstances.
The critical perspective, in contrast, calls into question those
elements that the reference pictures have in common. The main
targets usually are the more fundamental levels of procedure.
The critical approach typically operates within that common procedural structure which defines a picture's inner logic, interprets
the context, and organizes the various procedural elements. An
approach that limited itself to the more superficial levels of procedure would hardly deserve the name "critical". The critical enterprise identifies reference pictures' shared assumptions and
challenges their validity. It proposes alternative premises and
thus ends up imagining a radically different procedure.
It is crucial to resist the temptation to say simply that the
critical perspective focuses on the foundation while the comparative perspective deals with the details of procedural pictures. For
one, there are no definite criteria to demarcate those aspects of a
procedural picture that are part of its foundation from those that
constitute mere details. More importantly, the comparative perspective becomes interesting on matters of substance as well as
procedure to the extent that it goes beyond details.2 58 The assertion that the critical perspective focuses on a procedural picture's
more abstract or fundamental aspects, hence, does not establish
an exclusive domain for that perspective.
The best way to understand the critical approach is by visualizing how it would unfold in a concrete scenario, such as the
one at the heart of this article. I will first challenge critically the
premise that the sole end of procedure generally,and of international procedure specifically,is to resolve individual disputes. I
will propose that international procedure strives, more significantly, to reconfigure international spaces, that is, to transform
the manner in which international actors interact. Thereafter, I
will critically examine the idea that procedure's exclusive aim is
to advance particular ends. I will advance a reflexive conception,
258. For instance, Mary Anne Glendon's comparative work on divorce and abortion law in Western Europe and the United States is illuminating precisely because
she explains the divergence in foundational terms. She tries to show that these two
legal systems come apart in their underlying philosophical conception of human
rights. A comparative approach to international human rights would be especially
enlightening if it offered guidance on how to choose among these alternative paradigms or on how to move to a diverse but unified international paradigm.
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according to which procedure also pays attention to the relations
promoted internally among procedural actors.
The critique starts with one of the central premises shared
by both the common law and civil law procedural pictures, i.e.,
the notion that the end of procedure is to resolve disputes. 259
Both the common law and civil law legal systems organize procedure around the "dispute-resolution model". 260 In this model,
procedure seeks to settle individual controversies between the
parties following a given set of substantive legal principles. 2 61

Procedural institutions must accordingly facilitate the resolution
of these (prototypically individual) disputes. 262 The common law
259. The civil law tradition has been thought to offer in itself an alternative to the
dispute resolution model. Because that tradition offers a procedure that is less adversarial, where the decision maker is more involved, one might be tempted to assert
that procedure in the civil law tradition is more in tune with the structural reform
and the international reconfiguration paradigms, both discussed infra. Yet, such a
statement about the civil law tradition would be based more on a romantic illusion
than on a realistic understanding. The civil law tradition, procedurally, is just as
obsessed with dispute resolution as its common law counterpart, if not more. The
civil law tradition, as it has developed since the advent of modernity, sets private
law, that is the dispute between individuals, at its very center. The civil code is
supposed to be the model for all other areas of law; hence the denomination the
"civil law" tradition. And the ideology of that civil code is the freedom of the individual; individuals freely choose (by contract) the obligations that bind them and the
legal system merely enforces the duties previously recognized. Within this paradigm, the aim of procedure is to settle disputes between individuals. "The ultimate
end of procedure," Mexican proceduralist Carlos Arellano Garcia declares unequivocally, "is the solution of the controversy or controversies submitted." Garcia, supra
note 197, at 13. See also JosP BECERRA BAUTISTA, EL PROCESO CIVIL EN M8XICO 1
(1986) ("The normal end of procedure is to obtain a binding sentence that resolves a
controversy among the parties regarding substantive rights.") What the civil law
tradition does offer is ideas that, transformed, may advance ends other than dispute
resolution. Its conception of procedural structure and of the role of the decision
maker are examples. But the common law can fulfill this function as well. The common law categories such as the class action or the injunction may also help in the
move away from the dispute resolution model.
260. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, supra note 142, at 17. See also Owen M. Fiss, The
Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, in PROCEDURE 219, 220 (R.M.
Cover, O.M. Fiss, & J. Resnick eds. (1988) [hereinafter Fiss, Social and Political
Foundations];Chayes, Public Law Litigation,supra note 136, at 4. ) ("In the classical
model, litigation is viewed as a mode of dispute settlement."); Chayes, Role of the
Judge, supra note 131, at 1282. ("In our received tradition, the lawsuit is a vehicle for
settling disputes between private parties about private rights.").
261. Fiss observes that "the dispute-resolution model. .. is triadic and highly individualistic: a lawsuit is visualized-with the help of the icon of justice holding the
scales of justice-as a conflict between two individuals, one called plaintiff and the
other defendant, with a third standing between the two parties, as a passive umpire,
to observe and decide who is right, who is wrong, and to declare that the right be
done." Fiss, The Forms of Justice, supra note 142, at 17.
262. "The [dispute-resolution model's] world is composed exclusively of individuals.... The party structure of the dispute resolution lawsuit reflects this individualistic bias: one neighbor is pitted against another while the judge stands between
them as a apassive umpire." Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations; See also
Chayes, supra note 260, at 221.

1997]

PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

269

and the Mexican civil law procedural pictures, though thoroughly

at odds with each other in many respects, converge on the same
ultimate goal: the settlement of individual disputes. The common law approach structures procedure around a rather formal
proceeding, relies on a long pleading and discovery stage to pre-

pare that hearing, assigns the parties an active role relative to the
judge, and allows only a limited appeal. Mexican civil law proce-

dure turns on a series of flexible hearings, provides for only a
minimal and not clearly demarcated pleading and discovery

phase, requires much more procedural engagement from judges
than from the parties, and permits a somewhat broader appeal.
Yet, both procedural pictures assume that their aim is to resolve
determinate controversies. Each relies on a very idiosyncratic set
of procedural devices to realize that objective.
Owen M. Fiss submits that modern law has given rise to a
new kind of litigation, which does not fit the dispute resolution
model well.2 63 This development is associated with historical
264

emergence of the welfare state in western industrial societies.

The cases Fiss has in mind normally involve the massive institutions generated by the welfare state.265 The goal of procedure
then becomes to make possible the reformation of these institutions.2 66 Oftentimes plaintiffs represent larger societal interests
263. According to Fiss, "Adjudication is the social process by which judges give
meaning to our public values." Fiss, supra note 142, at 2. See also Fiss, supra note
260, at 219 Fiss maintains that "within recent decades a new form of constitutional
adjudication has emerged." Id. See also Chayes, supra note 131, at 1282. ("We are
witnessing the emergence of a new model of civil litigation and, I believe, our traditional conception of adjudication and the assumptions upon which it is based provide an increasingly unhelpful, indeed misleading framework for assessing either the
workability or the legitimacy of the roles of judge and court within this model.").
264. "Twentieth century America, particularly in the decades following the New
Deal and World War II, has seen the emergence of a different kind of state altogether; the state has become an active participant in our social life, supplying essential services and otherwise structuring the very terms of our existence. . . . The
emergence and legitimation of the activist state in the 1960s parallels the emergence
and legitimation of this new form of litigation that I have called structural reform."
Fiss, supra note 260, at 226. See also Chayes, supra note 131, at 1284.
265. The litigation is about the "reconstruction of a prison,... a school system, a
welfare agency, a hospital, or any bureaucracy." Fiss, supra note 142, at 41. "School
desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners' or inmates' rights cases,"
Abram Chayes explains, "come readily to mind as avatars of this new form of litigation." Chayes, supra note 131, at 1284. Chayes warns that "it would be a mistake to
suppose that it is confined to these areas. Antitrust, securities fraud and other aspects of the conduct of corporate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, union
governance, consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental management-cases in all these fields display in varying degrees the
features of public law litigation." Id.
266. "This new form of adjudication is largely defined by two characteristics.
The first is the awareness that the basic threat to our constitutional values is posed
not by individuals, but by the operations of large-scale organizations, the bureaucracies of the modern state. Secondly, this new mode of litigation reflects the realiza-
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and defendants are the institutions. 267 Plaintiffs seek not the settlement of a specific controversy they have with the defendant,

but rather a transformation of the defendant.2 68 For instance, a
group of inmates in a maximum security prison may charge that
the conditions of their incarceration are inhuman.2 69 The court's

objective is not simply to decide whether the defendant committed a wrong against the plaintiffs calling for compensation under

the existing law.2 70 Instead, the question is whether the way in
which the challenged institution operates violates basic human
rights and, if so, how to change that mode of operation so that
those rights will be protected. 271 Fiss calls this alternative para272
digm the "structural reform" model.
When the end of procedure is to process the resolution of

disputes, procedural institutions function intermittently or sporadically. 273 They come in only occasionally, when a dispute
tion that, unless the organizations that threaten these values are restructured, these
threats to constitutional values cannot and will not be eliminated." Fiss, supra note
260, at 219.
267. "In structural reform, the unity implicit in the concept of party disintegrates... and the exclusively individualistic perspective shifts to one that includes
social groups and institutional advocates." Fiss, supra note 142, at 19. See also Fiss,
supra note 260, at 221. "The class suit," which reflects to the new procedural model,
"is a reflection of our growing awareness that a host of important public and private
interactions-perhaps the most important in defining the conditions and opportunities of life for most people-are conducted on a routine or bureaucratized basis and
can no longer be visualized as bilateral transactions between private individuals.
From another angle, the class action responds to the proliferation of more or less
well-organized groups in our society and the tendency to perceive interests as group
interests .. " Chayes, supra note 131, at 1282.
268. "The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy
over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization
to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements." Fiss, supra note 142, at 2. "The remedial task requires the restructuring of
the organization, a complex and difficult task wholly alien to the dispute resolution
model." Fiss, supra note 260, at 221.
269. See e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F. 2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971) (cited in Fiss, supra note 142, at 41).
270. "Looking at the matter from the defendant side, it should also be noted that
structural reform involves a shift away from the concept of a wrongdoer, understood
in any individualistic sense; the function of the lawsuit is not to punish or judge the
conduct of some individuals, but to eliminate threats to constitutional values." Fiss,
supra note 260, at 221.
271. "The court is thus able to think in wholly prospective terms and to place the
burden of the remedy on an institution that could not rightly be considred a "wrongdoer," even in a metaphoric sense, but is the one most capable of safeguarding the
values in question." Id. at 221.
272. Fiss, supra note 142, at 2. See also Fiss, supra note 260, at 219. Abram
Chayes terms "the emerging model 'public law litigation.' " Chayes, supra note 128,
at 1284. See also Chayes, supra note 139, at 4.
273. "The focus in the dispute-resolution model is the incident, the transaction or
occurrence, and the remedial phase is largely episodic." Fiss, supra note 142, at 27.
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arises. 274 When there is no dispute or the court has decided the

case, individuals are on their own; procedure retreats.2 75 If the
goal of procedure is to process structural reform, however, proce-

dural institutions are constantly on call. They get involved in

cases for indefinite periods of time.2 76 The determination of

whether and how reform should take place requires long and intense procedural engagement. The implementation of reform2 7is7
usually even more demanding on the procedural institutions.

for periodic review and reviThese institutions have to provide
2 78

sion of the course of the reform.
This structural reform model is part of what I have referred
to as a counter picture of procedure. It focuses on a manner of
conducting and thinking of procedure that is at odds with the
ordinary manner. It may eventually transform or replace certain
elements of the dominant procedural picture. Fiss's contention is
that this alteration or substitution has already started to take
place, particularly in the United States. 279 Indeed, a counter picture may only challenge and ultimately replace an existing picture in which it already has roots. Otherwise, its alien nature
would render it both unappealing and inaccessible to actors
trained in the predominant picture. This means that the actual
conception and practice of procedure must contain features that
contravene the prevailing picture and that point to the
counterpicture. The formulation of the counterpicture may bring
further changes to the conception and practice of procedure up
274. "As suggested by the concept of a 'dispute' itself, the story assumes that the
subject of adjudication is an abnormal event that disrupts an otherwise satisfactory
world. It also suggests that the function of adjudication is to restore the status quo."
Fiss, supra note 260, at 222.
275. "The goal of dispute resolution is to set things back to normal; the remedy is
short and discreet since it simply undertakes to reestablish the world which existed
before the dispute." Fiss, id. at 219.
276. Fiss argues that "the goal of this new mode of litigation is to create a new
status quo, one that will be more nearly in accord with our constitutional ideals. The
restructuring of a prision or school system cannot be understood as an attempt to
return to a world that existed prior to some dispute; it represents an attempt to
construct a new social reality, the remedy may have to last almost as long as the
social reality it attempts to create." Id. at 222-23.
277. "The remedial phase in structural litigation.., involves a long, continuous
relationship between the judge and the institution; it is concerned not with the enforcement of a remedy already given, but with the giving and shaping of the remedy
itself." Fiss, supra note 142, at 27.
278. "Once an ongoing remedial regime is established, the same procedure may
be repeated in connection with the implementation and enforcement of the decree.
Compliance problems may be brought to the court for resolution and, if necessary,
further mediation." Chayes, supra note 131, at 1301.
279. Fiss argues that "within recent decades a new form of constitutional adjudication has emerged. . ., which [he] calls 'structural reform'." Fiss, supra note 260, at
219.
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to the point at which the counterpicture becomes dominant and
supersedes the original picture.
It is no surprise that international legal procedure, under the
influence of the dominant national pictures, has embraced dispute resolution as its end. Actually, the procedural dimension of
international treaties presents itself, as a matter of course, as a
dispute settlement procedure. 280 International legal procedure
has embarked on this procedural route in part following the lead
of national procedure but also for reasons of its own. In the international context, there is a very limited legal procedural infrastructure with no reliable enforcement mechanisms.
International actors characteristically agree to set up procedural
devices for certain cases or kinds of cases. Because the principal
international actors, i.e., the states, are extremely wary of diluting their claim to sovereignty in any way, they severely restrict
the authority of the ad hoc procedural institutions thus established. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that these institutions' aim is normally the resolution of sporadic disputes
between two parties. Contemplating a more involved or radical
purpose appears to be out of the question.
However, reducing the ends of procedure to dispute resolution is even more problematic in the international than in the
national context. International legal procedure normally must
reconfigure international spaces, not just settle individual controversies. That is, procedure has to intervene in a given international area and alter the premises of interaction among all the
actors involved, e.g., states, state agencies or departments, state
officials, private associations (such as corporations or unions), individuals, and groups of individuals. International legal procedure must also transform the institutional or behavioral
structures of these actors in order to effect a permanent change
in the way in which the actors relate to each other. This entire
process of reconfiguring an international space inevitably brings
about a drastic alteration in the understanding and application of
operative norms such as state sovereignty, individual rights, commercial fairness, and transnational justice.
A new international legal procedure usually comes to existence following a shift in the expectations associated with a particular international space. For instance, the prevalent approach to
abductions in transnational child custody cases-characterized
by uncertainty, arbitrariness, and delay-might give rise to deep
frustration and eventually lead to a call for a new procedure in
280. See, e.g., NAFTA, ch. 19 ("Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Matters") & ch. 20 ("Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures").
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281
order to bring fairness and stability to this international space.
Nation states must ultimately push through the novel international procedure but, more often than not, other actors, such as
multinational corporations, unions, consumer groups, environmental associations, human rights activists, or even private individuals, lobby the states to act. In my example, women's groups
might take the initiative in pressuring the states. At any rate, it is
dissatisfaction with the current configuration of an international
space that normally leads to the establishment of international
procedure. When the interests in conflict with the mode of procedural interaction in a specific international context reach a critical mass, a new legal procedure is born. The enacted procedure
displaces the standard operating procedure. Beyond merely
changing the applicable rules, this procedure must transform international conventions and institutions, as well as the actors that
operate within them.
A legal procedure bent exclusively on dispute resolution will
not be up to the task. It will only allow for a superficial and
temporary settlement of legal claims and will be unable to carry
out the reconfiguration of international space. The premises of
interaction will remain unaltered. In other words, there will be
essentially no change in the international context, i.e., the international institutions and conventions, within which international
actors interact. International procedure will affect the pertinent
actors as an outside, almost arbitrary, force. It will move these
international figures not to transform their institutional and behavioral structure but only to build mechanisms either to escape
or to cope with the intermittent and externally-focused sanctions.
Even in those cases that seem best to fit the dispute resolution model, the model distorts many cardinal aspects. Cases concerning antidumping duty determinations, for instance, appear to
be just narrow disputes between a domestic competitor and a foreign (alleged) dumper. Nevertheless, these cases inevitably have
additional layers of complexity. The domestic producer is actually claiming that the inner dynamics of the alleged dumperusually a foreign corporation or group of corporations-make it
possible and beneficial to dump. The specific contention might
281. See Patricia M. Hoff, Conference de La Haye de droit internationalprive.
Actes et documents de la Quatorzieme session (1980). Book III-Child abduction, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 723 (1984) (book review) ("In October 1980, the Hague Conference
on Private International Law adopted the Convention on the Civil Aspects of InterReflecting a worldwide concern about the harmful
national Child Abduction ....
effects on children of unilateral, nonconsensual disruptions in their custody, the
Convention is designed to secure the prompt return of children who have been
wrongfully removed to, or retained in, Contracting States, and to facilitate the exercise of visitation rights across international borders.").
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be that the alleged dumper has a monopolistic advantage at
home that enables it to take the temporary loss associated with
dumping. A further argument might be that the alleged
dumper's method of production and organization allows it to
preserve the unduly gained market advantage even after it stops
dumping. A domestic investigating authority imposes an antidumping duty, which may be internationally reviewable. The
antidumping duty's ultimate aim is not to penalize a discrete act
of overpricing but rather to restructure the dumper, or at least its
pricing structure. Insofar as they empower investigating agencies
to impose duties indefinitely and they provide for periodic review of the duties, 282 existing procedures implicitly recognize this
goal. Procedure thus remains active until the dumper alters its
pricing structure.
There are other features of antidumping cases, beyond the
organizational complexity of the parties and the ongoing nature
of the violation, that render the dispute resolution model inadequate. Dumping becomes an international law issue only to the
extent that it affects interests over and above those of the parties.
Dumping is not simply conduct engaged in by the dumper to the
detriment of a particular domestic producer. A dumping violation typically pits a group of foreign producers along with a foreign government against the local government and producers.
This is because the alleged dumper's conduct supposedly injures
the local economy and the general welfare of the importing country's people. The foreign state has an interest because the duty
not only affects one of the state's constituents but also might
function as a non-tariff barrier to trade. Dumping would be of
no interest to international law if it did not have these broader,
public international dimensions.
International antidumping procedures intervene in this
highly complex international space, which encompasses a wide
range of interests. Within that international space, foreign corporations export goods and services produced in a foreign country to the domestic country, in which consumers purchase the
exports and local producers see their competitive position
threatened. The importing government, yielding to the pressure
282. "It was generally agreed that anti-dumping duties should remain in place
only so long as they were genuinely necessary to counteract dumping which was
causing or threatening material injury to a domestic industry. In this connexion it
was noted that any country imposing a duty would naturally be free to review it and
the Group agreed that it might well be desirable for it to do so from time to time in
the light of information at its disposal. It was further agreed that it should be open
to exporters of the product concerned, if they considered that they had the necessary
evidence, to request the importing country to carry out a review of the facts." "1959
Report of the Group of Experts on Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties" 8S/
151-52, para. 23.
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of forces associated with local production (e.g., local corporations, unions) against the claims of interests aligned with the foreign exporters (e.g., consumer groups, local distributors, or even
foreign governments), unleashes its legal apparatus to impose antidumping duties.
The international legal procedure seeks to reconfigure this
intricate international space so that local governments and companies do not use antidumping duties arbitrarily to hinder free
trade. In the reconfigured international space dumping would
still constitute an unfair trade practice.2 83 Governments could
use their laws and their instrumentalities to thwart foreign corporations violating this principle of commercial fairness. They
could thus stop foreign companies from using a large reserve of
accumulated profits, an extraordinary capacity to absorb losses
for a long period of time, or a monopolistic advantage at home or
elsewhere to undersell and ultimately undermine domestic companies. At the same time, less competitive local producers would
find it difficult to coerce their government into deploying its antidumping apparatus to harass and ward off foreign competitors.
Local consumers would have access to cheaper and better products. Domestic distributors of foreign products would be on an
equal footing with distributors of domestic products.
The commitment to the dispute resolution model generally
has a limiting and distorting effect on international legal procedure. International procedure involves-even more immediately
than national procedure-public values and interests. The
reconfiguration of international spaces is a paramount aim. The
critical perspective introduces a conception of international procedure that incorporates this objective. Even though it challenges international proceduralists' obsession with the goal of
dispute resolution, the critical approach does not go on simply to
propose a completely extraneous end. It seeks, instead, to articulate a goal that international procedure already contains but has
not yet consistently worked through. The critical approach purports to transform international legal procedure by bringing it
closer to its own aspirations. In this sense, the critique is internal. The end result is a counterpicture of international
procedure.
The critical approach must go beyond challenging the traditional end of procedure, on which the various underlying national pictures and the prevailing international picture explicitly
283. See, e.g., NAFTA, art. 1902, 1 2(d)(ii) ("the object and purpose of this
Agreement and this Chapter... is to establish fair and predictable conditions for the
progressive liberalization of trade between the Parties to this Agreement while
maintaining effective and fair disciplines on unfair trade practices").
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converge, by merely postulating an alternative end. The main
flaw of the dispute resolution model is not the identification of
dispute resolution as a procedural objective but rather the postulation of that objective as the sole or paradigmatic aim of procedure. The critical enterprise should not err in the opposite
direction by declaring legal reconfiguration the only end of international procedure. Rather it should limit itself to asserting that
that end is important, maybe even paradigmatic, while preserving
the goal of resolving disputes. The key is to embrace the possibility of an international procedure that advances various objectives simultaneously.
The new procedural picture should consequently include
some elements that make possible such a reconfiguration and
others that facilitate dispute resolution. An international antidumping procedure should, for instance, allow both the reconfiguration of the space within which states regulate dumping as
well as the settling of particular controversies between domestic
and foreign producers. When integrating different objectives
into a single procedural picture, however, it is essential to assure
that the end product is coherent. If too concerned with dispute
resolution, for instance, the procedural picture might impede international legal reconfiguration. This need for cohesion calls to
mind that which arises when taking the comparative perspective.
Just as the procedural elements of various countries must harmonize when integrated into a new international procedural picture,
the multiple objectives need to coalesce into a workable procedural agenda.
Building the objective of international legal reconfiguration
into a specific procedure systematically would, naturally, lead to
significant changes in the understanding and practice of that procedure. The North American Free Trade Agreement's antidumping and countervailing duty determination review
procedure would be quite different in its formulation and its application if it were completely true to the aim of reconfiguring
the space within which states regulate unfair trading practices. It
would ride on a different conception of the nature of the process,
of the decision maker's role, and of the party structure.
A legal procedure aimed at international reconfiguration
would have a different understanding of the nature of the violation. The violation would consist not simply in a wrong that the
foreign producer inflicts upon its domestic counterpart but also
in the existence of a situation that does not allow free commerce
to flourish. The process that serves to investigate and address the
violation, like the violation itself, would be amorphous. In this
sense, the international process would resemble its civil law
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equivalent 284 and demarcate itself from the well-defined common
law process. Further, the international process would be, again

like the underlying violation, continuous and spread-out, in condispute resolution in both
trast to the discrete, and short-lived
285

common law and civil law systems.
The investigative process would be flexible, having no predetermined form. The tribunal would rely on written and oral
communications as it deemed most appropriate in light of the
circumstances to determine the extent to which the current configuration needs restructuring. The inquest would, additionally,
be ongoing. The procedural code would allow the review process
would start before a final determination and cover the investigating authority's interlocutory orders whenever waiting any longer
would endanger the reconfiguration mission.2 86 The process
would run without interruption through the original imposition
28 7
of duties and all subsequent administrative reconsiderations.
All these stages would be part of the same process. That process
would actually flow through the totality of cases before the tribunal. The court, aided by its precedential powers, would set out a
coherent reconfigurative course throughout the multiplicity of
controversies that emerged. By the same token, the process
would be drawn-out. It would not be over once the tribunal reviews the initial final determination. The court would remain involved through several administrative rounds. Even after the
final round, the process would continue inasmuch as other cases
would be not separate from but rather an integral part of that
process.

284. Of course, the aim of legal reconfiguration would inform the critically transformed process, while the goal of dispute resolution motivates the civil law process.
285. See Chayes, supra note 131, at 1282. ("The lawsuit [in the dispute resolution
model] is a self-contained episode. The impact of the judgment is confined to the
parties. If plaintiff prevails there is a simple compensatory transfer, usually of
money, but occasionally the return of a thing or the performance of a definite act. If
defendant prevails, a loss lies where it has fallen. In either case, entry of judgment
ends the court's involvement."). See also Chayes, supra note 139, at 5.
286. For example, the international court would have jurisdiction if the investigating authority enters an unjustified order compelling the alleged dumper or subsidy recipient to disclose highly confidential trade secrets. If not subject to
immediate review, such a decrees would threaten arbitrarily and irreparably to harm
even innocent foreign producers and might ultimately dissuade them from standing
up to the investigating authority. Of course, the investigating authority might issue a
similar order against domestic producers and pressure them to drop potentially legitimate claims. This is precisely the kind of scenarios that the reconfiguration effort
seeks to preclude.
287. This change would not call for further amendments to the procedural code
beyond the establishment of a permanent tribunal discussed in the previous section.
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The remedial process would also be unstructured, continuous, and prolonged. 28 8 The procedural code would authorize the
tribunal to draw freely on monetary, injunctive, and declaratory
relief to achieve its end. The implementation of the remedy
would not be -a one-shot deal. If it imposed or endorsed any of
these forms of relief, including monetary duties, 28 9 the court
would stay engaged, monitor the participants, make adjustments,
and eventually withdraw. Obviously, the remedial phase would
extend over a long period of time.
Inevitably, the investigative and remedial process would
sprawl-amorphously, continuously, and indefinitely-from the
space within which administrative agencies impose antidumping
and countervailing duties to the broader space within which international trade interaction occurs. Reconfiguring the former
space is part of reconfiguring the latter. In other words, only
with a rather clear idea of how the new international commercial
order should look, is it possible to imagine and construct an appropriate scheme for the regulation of dumping and unfair subsidies. The North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter 19,
which regulates antidumping and countervailing duty matters,
explicitly presents itself as an integral part of the Agreement's
larger aspiration to reconfigure the space within which North
American trade takes place. It declares that:
the object and purpose of this Agreement and this Chapter...
is to establish fair and predictable conditions for the progressive liberalization of trade between the Parties to this Agreement while maintaining
effective and fair disciplines on unfair
290
trade practices ....
Inasmuch as it would have to develop a vision of North American commercial integration anyway, the critically re-imagined
Article 1904 decision maker would have jurisdiction over other
procedural aspects of the Agreement, such as the interpretation
and application of the Agreement, as well as the examination of
allegedly inconsistent national measures, under Chapter 20; the
entertainment of claims brought by investors under Chapter 11;
or the implementation of the side agreements on labor and the
environment.
288. Fiss, supra note 142, at 27. ("The remedial phase in structural litigation...
involves a long, continuous relationship between the judge and the institution; it is
concerned not with the enforcement of a remedy already given, but with the giving
or shaping of the remedy itself.").
289. In cases involving monetary duties, the initial assessment may go through
several adjustments and eventually to a dissolution, based on the underlying
circumstances.
290. NAFTA, art. 1902, 2(d)(ii).
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Conceived broadly along these lines, the process would ultimately rest not on a negative but rather on a positive understanding of commercial integration. That is, it would go beyond
removing barriers to commercial integration to actually integrating economies under conditions of fairness and equality. Needless to say, the tribunal would be hard pressed not to take into
account the wide economic imbalance between north and south,
which is a major obstacle to free and equal trade in the region.
To that end, there would at least be some discussion as to
whether the procedure should be altered so that, like in the pro29 1
cedure under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the decision maker is empowered to take into account the special
situation of Mexico as a developing country when deciding cases.
The key questions here would be how to make effective use of
such power and whether the benefits accrued from granting such
an authority to the tribunal would outweigh the costs associated
with the inevitable perception of Mexico getting special
treatment.
An antidumping and countervailing duty review procedure
committed to the aim of international reconfiguration would call
for a decision maker more involved than that of the common law
procedural picture. It would require an active permanent tribunal along the lines described in the previous section. 292 The tribunal would similarly stay on top of the case and push it forward.
The ultimate aim would be not simply to resolve an individual
dispute, but also to reconfigure a particular international space.
Moreover, a reconfigurative procedure would attribute to the decision maker not only the process direction duty but also, under
certain circumstances, dispositive power. The civil law tradition
to determine the existence and the
defines this as the authority
293
scope of the controversy.
291. 1994 Uruguay Round Understanding on Dispute Settlement, art. 12, §11
(The panel must take into account the differential and more favorable treatment for
developing country Members.).
292. The amorphous, continuous, and drawn-out process previously described
would necessitate a permanent tribunal. First, a permanent tribunal would be able
to supervise investigating authorities more closely and promptly to step in to review
nonfinal decisions. By the time the signatory parties put together a panel it may be
too late. Second, the tribunal would be better able to stay with the case throughout
various reconsiderations. It is difficult to impanel the same group of persons for the
different stages of review in a given case. Third, a permanent court, especially if
vested with precedential authority, would be able to review the totality of cases and
develop a policy consistent with the reconfiguration effort. More generally, insofar
as it commands more prestige and legitimacy, the tribunal would be in a stronger
position than a panel to make the controversial decisions associated with in-depth
reform.

293. See

EDUARDO PALLARES, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL

(1966); Garcia, supra note 195, at 44; 77 ZPB 452.
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Common law systems put dispositive and well as process direction prerogatives solely in the hands of the parties. 294 Though

civil law jurisdictions impose the process direction obligation on
the judge, they generally restrict the dispositive power to the parties. 2 95 The parties in both common law and civil law cases initiate the procedure, define the object of the dispute, and may end

the process by mutual agreement. Only under extraordinary circumstances-such as when the procedure touches upon momentous public interests-do these legal traditions restrict the
application of the dispositive principle. 2 96

The Article 1904 panel review procedure, not surprisingly,
fully embodies this dispositive principle. The review is initiated

by the signatory parties, 297 and ends as soon as all of the partici-

pants consent to the termination. 298 Moreover, the panel must
limit itself to
(a) the allegations of error of fact or law, including challenges to the jurisdiction of the investigating authority, that

294. The following description of the United States procedural system by Owen
Fiss reflects the extent to which the U.S. common law tradition assigns both dispositive and process direction powers only to the parties: "In the United States, judges
do not initiate or carry forward the judicial process. They depend instead on an
outside agency [i.e., the parties] to start as well as to continue the proceedings. It is
that agency, not the judges, that conducts the factual investigation, selects and examines the witnesses, drafts the complaint and monitors the execution of the judicial
decisions." Owen Fiss, La teoria politica de las acciones de clase, 1 REVISTA
JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PALERMO

5 (1996). Chayes makes the following

statement about the dispute settlement model, which inhabits both the common law
and the civil law procedural pictures: "The process is party-initiated and party controlled. The case is organized and the issues defined by exchanges between the parties." Chayes, supra note 131, at 1283; See also Chayes, supra note 141, at 4. The
statement is true only of common law dispute resolution.
295. See

EDUARDO PALLARES, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL

598

(1966)(The dispositive principle establishes that "the exercise of the procedural action-both in its active and passive form-is entrusted to the parties and not to the
judge."); Garcfa, supra note 197, at 44.("In fact, as the process unfolds-from the
beginning until the end of the process-the initiative rests with the parties and not
with the adjudicator."). See also 77 ZPB 422.(The dispositive principle "means that
the parties have free disposal of the disputed matter.").
296. In the civil law tradition, the dispositive principle is reined in in some cases.
"These dispositive powers are limited to the extent that the parties should not be
materially in charge of the object of controversy, like in matrimony, family, and
custody (Kindschaft) matters." 77 ZPB 423. Garcfa, similarly, underscores that:
"The dispositive principle, which predominates in the Mexican civil process, is not
absolute but rather has various exceptions." Garcfa, supra note 197, at 44-45. As
examples, Arellano Garcfa mentions the judge's power, motu propio, to examine the
procedural capacity of the parties, to clarify the sentence, to impose disciplinary
sanctions, to hear evidence. Id. Yet, he appears to be confusing the process direction and the dispositive principles. The cases he mentions relate to the process direction (not the dispositive) principle and actually point to the fact that the process
direction duty rests with the judge, not the parties.
297. 1904 Panel R. 6.
298. 1904 Panel R. 72.
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are set out in the Complaints filed in the panel review; and (b)
and substantive defenses raised in the panel
procedural
299
review.

Panel Rule 35 commands the responsible secretary expressly to
underscore this restriction when serving the participants. 300 The
panel may not, sua sponte, come up with errors in or justifications for the determination; it may not consider any issue unless
raised by the participants. The Panel Rules also assign final control to the participants when a reversed and remanded case returns for a second panel review. Rule 73 establishes that if none
of the participants files a written submission challenging the new
determination, the panel must "issue an order affirming the investigating authority's Determination on Remand. ' '30 1 The panel
must affirm even if it believes that the investigating authority's
determination on remand is inconsistent with the its earlier
decision.
Even though the initiative to commence a review of antidumping or countervailing duty determinations would remain
in the hands of the signatory parties and participants, the critically transformed procedure would require court approval before
dismissal. The tribunal would thus be in a position to ascertain
whether the dismissal improperly infringes upon the individual,
collective, national, and international interests at stake. The decision maker would additionally have the authority to consider
allegations and defenses not raised by the participants. Finally,
the tribunal would be able to intervene even without the exhortation of the parties in remanded cases, in cases in which an investigating agency reconsiders a determination already reviewed
under Article 1904, and in cases of large public international interest. These powers would enable the court to expand its focus
beyond the narrow disputes associated with a particular determination. The decision maker would be in a position to concentrate
on the whole dumping or subsidy controversy running through
various administrative rounds as well as the larger international
reconfiguration process.
A procedure focused primordially on international reconfiguration would approach party structure drastically differently
than one concentrating exclusively on dispute resolution. "Litigation [in the dispute settlement model] is organized as a contest
between two individuals or at least two unitary interests, diamet'30 2
rically opposed, to be decided on a winner-takes-all basis.
The existing panel review system has clearly incorporated this
299.
300.
301.
302.

1904 Panel R.
1904 Panel R.
1904 Panel R.
Chayes, supra

7.
35(1)(c)(iii).
73(5).
note 131, at 1282.
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"bipolar" party arrangement, 30 3 on which both the common law
and the civil law procedural pictures converge. The Article 1904

procedure envisions a dispute between a complainant and the in-

vestigating authority 304 and aligns the rest of the participants
with one of these two originary two participants. 30 5
International antidumping and countervailing duty cases ac-

tually involve numerous parties with varying degrees of involvement and interest in the controversy. The signatory parties, i.e.,
the exporting or the importing country, request the review. The
governments of these countries include various subgroups such
as the agency making the determination, the secretariat, the ministry of commerce, the ministry of finance, the ministry of foreign
relations, and so on. The legislature as well as other groups in

the importing or exporting country often also have an interest in
the controversy. Foreign exporters, domestic importers, or the
domestic producers usually instigate the initiation of the review
process. These participants, who along with the investigating au-

thority are the main litigants, are normally large corporations
and as such break down into various interest groups or constituencies: the directors, the managers, the shareholders, the employees, the creditors, consumers, and even the members of the
community in which the corporations are located. Unions associated with production process as well as consumer groups accord30 6
ingly have a stake, as well.

Within a procedure that embraced international reconfiguration as a goal, the notion of participation would consequently be
fluid and policentric. In addition to the main parties (if the concept of a main party survived at all) there would be other participants, such as intervenors and friends of the court, with different
levels of interest in the case. Written and especially oral proceedings would have to be transformed to accommodate the multiplicity of participants. The procedure would allow class
303. Id. See also Chayes, supra note 139, at 4.
304. The investigating authority files a notice of appearance and a brief against
the complainant's complaint and brief. 1904 Panel R. 39, 40, & 57.
305. Participants may file pleadings and briefs either in support of or in opposition to the complaint. 1904 Panel R. 39, 40, & 57. During oral argument the panel
hears first from "the complainant and any participant who filed a brief in support of
the allegations set out in a Complaint or partly in support of the allegations set out
in a Complaint and partly in opposition to the allegations set out in a Complaint"
and then from "the investigating authority and any participant who filed a brief in
[complete] opposition to the allegations set out in a Complaint". 1904 Panel R.
67(2)(a) & (b).
306. See Miramontes, supra note 18, at 660-61. ("Although interested third parties may instigate procedure for removal of countervailing duties, consumers, albeit
directly affected, are left without recourse under Mexican law. Consumers should
have standing in countervailing duties' proceedings. Mexico's Office of Consumer
Affairs could function as the representative of consumers.")(footnote omitted).
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participation for large groups, such as consumers or workers or
perhaps even the affected local producers.
Changing the party structure in the Article 1904 procedure
would require altering the participation provisions. The panel review Rules simply take over the party structure from the national
courts otherwise entitled to review final determinations. The expression "interested person", the Rules establish, "means a person who, pursuant to the laws of the country in which a final
determination was made, would be entitled to appear and be represented in a judicial review of the final determination. ' 30 7 Only
interested persons may file a complaint or notice of appearance
and thus become a "participant. ' 30 8 The term "person", in turn,
encompasses:
(a) an individual, (b) a [NAFTA] Party, (c) an investigating authority, (d) a government of a province, state or other
political subdivision of the country of a Party, (e) a department, agency or body of a Party or of a government referred
(d), or (e) a partnership, corporation or
to in paragraph
309
association.
The recognition of expansive participation rights as suggested
above would demand, first, changing the definition of "interested
person" to include any person who has a real interest in the underlying antidumping or countervailing duty determination. Second, the notion of a person would have to reach out to cover
groups of persons who desire to appear as a class. Finally, the
reconfigurative procedure would not organize participation in
pleadings, briefs, and oral argument around two sets of interests.
In other words, it would not divide participants into a complainant and a respondent contingent but rather allow a free-floating
arrangement.
The critical perspective opens up possibilities beyond that of
doing justice to neglected procedural aims. It might lead to the
destabilization of the notion that procedure has value only to the
extent that it advances particular ends. 3 10 A critically transformed international legal procedure would be not only instrumental but also reflexive. It would be outward looking, as well as
inward looking. It would, in other words, focus on the legitimacy
of both the ends it furthers and the way in which it is constituted.
Procedure must not only attain a justified end, but also generate
307. 1904 Panel R. 3 "interested person").
308. Id. ("participant").
309. Id. ("person").
310. Fiss couches structural reform in instrumental terms. He affirms that "this
new mode of litigation raises [the problem of] instrumentalism. Simply stated, the
question presented is how to do the job of structural reform, and how to do it well."
Fiss, supra note 260, at 219-20. See also Fiss, supra note 142, at 50. ("The structural
remedy must be seen in instrumental terms.").
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the right kind of relations among international actors. From the
critical perspective, procedure has intrinsic worth; it gives rise,
internally, to a set of relations among the participants with value
independent any external goal.
The critical project would seek to abolish alienating procedural relationships. Such relationships not only disadvantage but
also disempower international actors. From the critical vantage
point, international procedure would set up an emancipating relational structure. It would strive to honor the dignity and autonomy of all procedural actors. A critically reassessed procedure
would discard disempowering relationships even if they furthered the international reconfiguration effort.
The new procedural picture would, accordingly, have to reorganize radically the relationships among the various international actors. It would heavily emphasize the right of individuals,
entities, and groups to assert and realize themselves within the
procedure. In this context, the ideas such as granting liberal participatory rights (including class participation) or forcing the national parties to subsidize the representation of those actors
lacking sufficient means would become appealing. The elimination of any deference to the investigating authority and the institution of de novo review would have to be part of the critical
project to purge the procedure of internal relational iniquities.
The reconstructed procedure would, in addition to considering
new evidence, provide for far-reaching discovery to remedy the
imbalance in information among the participants.
A procedure conceived along these lines would require a
strong and active decision maker as well as a flexible process.
The notion of a permanent tribunal with wide injunctive and
proactive powers and the authority to adapt the process to the
circumstances at hand would become attractive once more. The
members of the tribunal intervening in a particular case would
submit detailed opinions defending their positions and would
thus base their relationship to each other and to the parties on
respect rather than caprice.
As it transcends the instrumental model, the critical approach would also pay close attention to the procedural relationship among the signatory parties. It would point to an
international legal procedure in which the countries involved relate to each other fairly and as equals. The procedure would
avoid reproducing or reinforcing extra-procedural hegemonies.
The decision maker would allocate participatory rights, distribute
costs, and provide access to information so as to render the relationship among the pertinent countries emancipating rather than
alienating. The critical approach would make sure that the relations of domination, which it seeks to abolish among private par-
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ties and between private parties and governmental institutions,
do not persist at the intra-governmental level.
A reflexively legitimate international legal procedure would
insist upon the equal treatment of the official languages of all
signatory parties. Excluding Mexico's language from the procedural universe spanned by the Agreement disempowers not just
particular Mexican participants but the Mexican nation as a
whole. The critical enterprise would push for the abandonment
of this linguistic narrow-mindedness. The critically reformed
procedure would treat Spanish as equal to French and English. It
would allow participants to use the Spanish language, make
translators readily available, and require publication of the tribunal's communications in all three languages.
The critical approach would, moreover, insist that the procedural structure of the North American Free Trade Agreement
not systematically exclude the procedural perspectives of any of
the countries involved. The international procedure formulated
from the critical standpoint would have to open itself up to the
Canadian and especially the Mexican procedural perspectives in
the manner suggested in the previous section. In addition to facilitating the resolution of disputes under the Agreement and advancing the reconfiguration of the international space within
which the Agreement operates, the incorporation of certain features from these neglected perspectives would contribute to the
and particularly Mexico within the proempowerment of Canada
31 1
cedural world created.
One can hardly exaggerate the extent to which a country is
disempowered when it is forced to act within a completely alien
procedural system, or when an alien procedural structure is
foisted upon its own procedural system. A people expresses its
identity or its national spirit through law, including procedural
law. Undermining a people's law is tantamount to thwarting that
people's identity. Conversely, re-affirming the legal heritage
311. To be sure, Mexican and Canadian law, including procedural law, is itself
the result of a process of legal imperialism. In both cases, the indigenous legal traditions were repressed in favor of the law brought along by the European conquerors.
(The indigenous legal practices themselves became dominant to a great extent by
suppression the law of conquered peoples.) The existing legal culture in Mexico and
in Canada descends from this original onslaught. Canada's history of legal colonization also includes the attempt to displace law of French origin with law of English
roots. Yet, the pervasiveness of repression in the historical evolution of law should
not lead to the complete abdication of the possibility of open and uncoercive legal
development. New law-particularly new international law-must seek the latter kind
of development. Existing law, which came to life through domination rather than
deliberation, need not (and probably cannot) be simply done away with. It must
recognize the horrors of its past, as well as those of its present, and try to rectify and
to avoid recidivism. Like human beings, law should not aim at moral perfection; it
should only seek constant moral improvement.
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leads to a reinforcement of the sense of self-worth of a nation.
International law, of course, has no obligation to incorporate elements of the legal systems of various nation as a token gesture of
inclusion. What international treaties must do is keep an open
mind in the face of the multiplicity of legal possibilities that the
international community has to offer. International agreements
validate nations whenever they take seriously their potential contributions, even if they ultimately reject such contributions.
The critical perspective, in sum, makes way for the possibility of a radical deconstruction and reconstruction of international
procedure, generally, and of the Article 1904 procedure, specifically. A critical approach would lead international procedure
away from the dispute resolution model and toward the recognition of international legal reconfiguration as a central aim. It
would transform the conception of the nature of the process, of
the decision maker's role, and of the party structure. More importantly, it would take international procedure beyond the instrumental to a reflexive conception of procedure. International
procedure would then become more inward looking and strive
internally to create reasonable relationships among the international procedural actors. This critical endeavor would thus set off
a debate on the most fundamental premises shared by national
and international procedural pictures.
VIII.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Needless to say, there was no room for comparative or critical reflection in the negotiations that resulted in the North
American Free Trade Agreement. In this sense, the process was
typical. International actors forge agreements under pressure,
with economic and political muscle steering the course. The
challenge is to get the comparative and critical debate started
outside the negotiation arena and before the commencement of
the actual bargaining. In other words, these issues must first penetrate the present legal consciousness, perhaps through reflective
discussion among theorists and practitioners. Thus, the issues
might be able to find their way in later, when hammering out the
details of international agreements.
There is an additional level of complexity involved here,
however. Two kinds of obstacles stand in the way of the introduction of the comparative and the critical perspective in international treaties: impediments of ignorance and impediments of
interest. First, international lawyers are often not even aware of
the possibility of a different perspective. They are often familiar
only with their own national legal picture and see their mission as
simply to apply that picture to an international context. In the
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rare cases in which they are conversant with various legal pictures, international lawyers invariably fail to integrate elements
from the different pictures into a new picture or take a critical
posture vis-A-vis shared procedural premises.
Second, international lawyers tend to reproduce their own
national procedural pictures because doing so is to the advantage
of the interests they represent. International lawyers and their
clients are able to secure a competitive edge over their adversary
if the game is played by their rules. The lawyers as well as the
nations who dominate the international legal system have partly
for these reasons excluded the comparative perspective. The
dominated side, for its part, has an interest in bringing in the
comparative perspective only to reduce the extent of its tactical
disadvantage. This side, however, is usually outmaneuvered.
Neither side, at any rate, has an interest in embracing the critical
approach. Such an approach would force both to make significant adjustments in their standard operating procedure. The side
with the upper hand would probably object more vehemently to
a critical alteration of the status quo than its counterpart, which
has to adapt to a novel legal situation anyway.
The impediments of ignorance and of interest-independently and in conjunction with each other-have contributed to
the relative absence of critical or even comparative reflection in
international agreements. Scholarly discussions on the merits of
bringing the comparative and the critical perspectives to international legal consciousness might help overcome the impediments
of ignorance but hardly those of interest. Even if everybody
were convinced of the advantages of taking the comparative and
critical perspectives, powerful international interests would probably remain adamant against any substantial changes in the prevailing point of view.
The introduction of a new perspective would actually require a transition not just in the theoretical orientation but also
in the practical conditions of international treaties. In other
words, the new perspective's prospects depend not only on understanding that incorporating such a perspective is fully in tune
with what the international treaties are all about, but also on altering the international balance of power. If the negotiations at
issue in international agreements took place under circumstances
of more equality than at present, there would be a tendency to
gravitate towards the comparative perspective. If no nation or
group of nations could force its ways into the international treaties, an ideal situation for a comparative approach would emerge.
The family of nations would then come to the bargaining table
with a multiplicity of legal points of view and strive to develop an
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international paradigm that incorporated select elements from
these different viewpoints in a congruent manner.
The launching of the comparative perspective would pave
the way for the critical perspective. I have already explained
how this is so: Once one realizes that there are alternatives with
respect to the points on which different legal pictures diverge,
one is hard pressed to deny the possibility of alternatives with
respect to the points on which the pictures converge. At the
practical level, the transformation of international agreements
from the comparative perspective creates a situation in which international lawyers and their clients are inevitably going to have
to operate in somewhat foreign legal terrain. They might therefore be less hostile to accepting the additional degree of unfamiliarity associated with a critical transformation of international
treaties. In other words, there might be economies of scale in the
process of coping with the unknown.
These economies of scale, however, would not provide sufficient incentive to embrace the theoretically acclaimed critical
perspective on the practical level. Additional impetus might
come from a parallel process of critical transformation of national law. That is, if the premises that are challenged from the
international critical perspective were already called into question in the context of national law, this might contribute stimulus
to the abandonment of those premises. 312 International actors
would be less invested in them, theoretically and practically. The
process of thinking and acting away from them would be well in
place by the time the international negotiations begin. Ignorance
and interest would not be as stacked up against critical reform.
This much too brief discussion suffices to suggest the complexity of instituting the comparative and critical perspective in
international agreements. A protracted and intricate metamorphosis in the theoretical and practical underpinnings of international treaties must take place first. A change in the state of
legal consciousness will not do, just as an alteration of legal reality will not be enough. The transformation of legal consciousness
and that of legal reality must be simultaneous and symbiotic. In
this sense, the process must be truly dialectic and perhaps even
revolutionary.

312. The critical alteration of national law may be somewhat easier than that of
international law. National law does not face as much skepticism and opposition to
begin with. National legal institutions are usually more solidly in place and are
therefore in a better position to withstand a radical process of transformation than
their international counterparts.

